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ANTIDISCRIMINATORY ALGORITHMS
Stephanie Bornstein*
Can algorithms be used to advance equality goals in the workplace? A handful of
legal scholars have raised concerns that the use of big data at work may lead to
protected class discrimination that could fall outside the reach of current antidiscrimination law. Existing scholarship suggests that, because algorithms are “facially neutral,” they pose no problem of unequal treatment. As a result, algorithmic
discrimination cannot be challenged using a disparate treatment theory of liability
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Instead, it presents a problem of unequal outcomes, subject to challenge using Title VII’s disparate impact
framework only. Yet under current doctrine, scholars suggest, any disparate impact
that results from an employer’s use of algorithmic decision-making could be excused as a justifiable business practice. Given this catch-22, scholars propose either
regulating the algorithms or reinterpreting the law.
This Article seeks to challenge current thinking on algorithmic discrimination. Both
the “improve the algorithms” and the “improve the law” approaches focus solely
on a clash between the anticlassification (formal equality) and antisubordination
(substantive equality) goals of Title VII. But Title VII also serves an important antistereotyping goal: the principle that people should be treated not just equally
across protected class groups but also individually, free from stereotypes associated
with even one’s own group. This Article is the first to propose that some algorithmic
discrimination may be challenged as disparate treatment using Title VII’s stereotype theory of liability. An antistereotyping approach offers guidance for improving
hiring algorithms and the uses to which they are put, to ensure that algorithms are
applied to counteract rather than reproduce bias in the workplace. Moreover, framing algorithmic discrimination as a problem of disparate treatment is essential for
similar challenges outside of the employment context—for example, challenges to
governmental use of algorithms in the criminal justice context raised under the
Equal Protection Clause, which does not recognize disparate impact claims.
The current focus on ensuring that algorithms do not lead to new discrimination at
work obscures that the technology was intended to do more: to improve upon human decision-making by suppressing biases to make the most efficient and least discriminatory decisions. Applying the existing doctrine of Title VII more robustly and
incorporating a focus on its antistereotyping goal may help deliver on the promise
of moving beyond mere nondiscrimination and toward actively antidiscriminatory
algorithms.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. For their helpful
comments and questions on presentations or drafts of this Article, my sincere thanks to Scott Bauries,
Jason Bent, Joseph Fishkin, Pauline Kim, Marcia McCormick, Katheryn Russell-Brown, Andrew
Selbst, and Charles Sullivan. My thanks as well to the participants in the 2017 Colloquium on Scholarship in Labor & Employment Law, the 2018 Law & Society Association Conference Program on the
Future of Workforce Management, and the 2018 SEALS Conference New Scholars Workshop. Thanks,
too, to Dale Dowden and Kaley Jaslow for their excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, prior to several years during which they would hire thousands
of workers, the leadership of online retail giant Amazon asked their machine-learning experts to develop an automated tool to help with hiring decisions.1 By 2015, their programmers recognized that the tool was plagued
by gender bias; by early 2017, they abandoned the effort.2 The goal was to
create an algorithm using artificial intelligence (AI) that could rank job
candidates to automate hiring.3 For the algorithm to learn what to value, the
programmers trained it to find patterns in resumes submitted for technical
jobs in the prior ten years, most of which—due to the demographics of who
holds those jobs—came from male applicants.4 As a result, the model
“taught itself” to prefer male candidates, “penaliz[ing] resumes that included the word ‘women’s,’ as in ‘women’s chess club captain,’” and “downgrad[ing] graduates of . . . all-women’s colleges.”5 The programmers corrected for that particular problem, but ultimately shelved the project, concerned that there “was no guarantee that the machines would not devise
other ways of sorting candidates that could prove discriminatory.”6
Amazon is by no means unique in seeking technological solutions to its
personnel needs. In 2018, LinkedIn conducted a survey of 9,000 hiring
managers and recruiting professionals about current and future trends in
workplace hiring.7 Half of respondents identified that data analytics was
“very” or “extremely important” to the future of hiring with nearly onefifth reporting that they had “mostly” or “completely adopted” its use in
their own practices to date.8 Likewise, 35% said that AI would be “very” or
“extremely important” to recruiting in the future, and nearly one in twelve
had already adopted its use.9 The survey confirms anecdotal evidence documenting the rise of data and AI in the workplace over the past decade.10 It

1. See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias Against Women, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automationinsight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. LINKEDIN TALENT SOLUTIONS, GLOBAL RECRUITING TRENDS 2018, https://business.linkedin
.com/content/dam/me/business/en-us/talent-solutions/resources/pdfs/linkedin-global-recruiting-trends-2
018-en-us.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Ken Gaebler, The Future of Hiring: Human Resources, Without the Humans,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/02/the-future-of-hiringhuman-resources-without-the-humans/252518; Aki Ito, Hiring in the Age of Big Data, BLOOMBERG
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also comes as no surprise: as with countless other facets of life (advertising,
banking, voting, tax auditing, medicine, and criminal justice, to name a
few), algorithms and data analytics are aiding or replacing decisions once
made entirely by humans.11
The rise of big data at work has sparked concerns about privacy and
procedural fairness12 and, more recently, discrimination.13 Employers are
now using algorithms to make hiring and other workplace decisions quickly and automatically. If the underlying data on which an algorithm relies is

(Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-24/new-way-to-assess-job-applica
nts-online-games-and-quizzes; Nathan R. Kuncel, Deniz S. Ones & David M. Klieger, In Hiring, Algorithms Beat Instinct, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/05/in-hiring-algorithms-beatinstinct; Claire Cain Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html.
11. For a definition of “algorithm,” see Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 674 n.10 (2016) (citing SOLON BAROCAS ET AL., DATA & CIVIL
RIGHTS: TECHNOLOGY PRIMER (2014), http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2014-1030/technology.pdf)
(“An ‘algorithm’ is a formally specified sequence of logical operations that provides step-by-step instructions for computers to act on data and thus automate decisions. Algorithms play a role in both
automating the discovery of useful patterns in datasets and automating decision making that relies on
these discoveries.”). For definitions of “artificial intelligence” (AI) and “machine learning,” see Bernard
Marr, What Is the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning?, FORBES (Dec. 6,
2016, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/12/06/what-is-the-difference-betw
een-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/3/#157219c52bfc (“Artificial Intelligence is the broader concept of machines being able to carry out tasks in a way that we would consider ‘smart’. . . . Machine Learning is a current application of AI based around the idea that we should really just be able to
give machines access to data and let them learn for themselves.”).
12. A sizeable body of literature now addresses concerns about privacy and procedural fairness
in the collection and use of employee data—topics that are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring Platforms and Wearable Technology as the New Data-Centric Research Agenda for Employment and Labor Law, 63 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. (forthcoming 2019); Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Tort and Contract Law
Issues, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225 (2014); Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 735 (2017); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored
Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason
Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55
B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an
Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18 (2017);
Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of Information Under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 17 (2016); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data
Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393 (2014); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal
of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). But see Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre
K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013).
13. See generally, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa, Age Discrimination by Platforms, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. (forthcoming 2019); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11; Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms
for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189 (2017) [hereinafter Kim, Auditing Algorithms];
Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017) [hereinafter Kim, Data-Driven]; Pauline Kim & Sharion Scott, Discrimination in Online Employment Recruiting, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2019); Charles A. Sullivan, Employing AI (Feb. 18, 2018) (Seton
Hall Public Law Research Paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3125738; Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017).
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itself biased, incomplete, or discriminatory, the decisions it makes have the
potential to reproduce inequality on a massive scale.14
Yet while data and AI were the third- and fourth-ranked top trends
identified by LinkedIn’s survey respondents, they were not the first.15 Most
cited as “very” or “extremely important” to the future of workplace hiring
was a commitment to diversity: 78% of respondents identified it as essential, and 53% already incorporated it as a focus in their recruiting efforts.16
In fact, the trend of hiring by algorithm grew out of a cottage industry of
tech start-ups seeking to help diversify Silicon Valley.17 Algorithmic decision-making offers unprecedented potential to reduce the stereotypes and
implicit biases that often infect human decisions.18 If both an intention to
use data analytics and a commitment to diversity in hiring are of high importance to the same majority of employers, surely the two objectives can
be aligned.19
A small, but robust, body of legal scholarship has begun to raise concerns about the potential for algorithmic decision-making to result in protected class discrimination in employment.20 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII) prohibits discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, and other “terms, conditions, [and] privileges” of employment on the
basis of protected classes, including race and sex.21 The few legal scholars
addressing algorithmic discrimination in the workplace agree that, while
using algorithms to make employment decisions offers the promise of reducing the biases inherent in human subjective decision-making, it also
poses a more significant, and dangerous, risk of reproducing existing ine-

14.

See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 677–93; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 883–

92.
15. LINKEDIN TALENT SOLUTIONS, supra note 7, at 4.
16. Id.
17. See infra Subpart I.A.
18. See infra Subpart II.C.
19. These trends may be most important to the segment of hiring professionals who responded to
LinkedIn’s survey and have more limited appeal to others. But it is precisely that segment—recruiters
and hiring managers likely to both use data analytics/AI and value diversity in hiring—to whom the
issue of algorithmic discrimination most applies.
20. See Ajunwa, supra note 13; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11; Kim, Auditing Algorithms,
supra note 13; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13; Kim & Scott, supra note 13; Kroll et al., supra note
13; Sullivan, supra note 13; see also Matthew T. Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics,
88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961 (2017) (surveying the field); James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2950018 (proposing a thought piece to illustrate limitations of existing law);
Allan G. King & Marko J. Mrkonich, “Big Data” and the Risk of Employment Discrimination, 68
OKLA. L. REV. 555 (2016) (same).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination because of race, color, national
origin, sex, or religion).

BORNSTEIN FINAL3 (DO NOT DELETE)

524

11/30/2018 2:11 PM

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:2:519

quality.22 Worse still, current scholarship suggests, the apparent neutrality
of algorithms and the “black box” nature of machine learning make this
hiring trend a new way of doing business that could be unreachable by existing antidiscrimination law.23
While they agree on the problem, scholars have proposed two different,
though complementary, solutions. One response focuses on regulating to
improve the algorithms themselves, based on computer science techniques
guided by Title VII.24 By requiring accountability for the ways in which the
underlying data may be flawed or the algorithmic process may incorporate
bias, this approach seeks to help reduce and prevent algorithmic discrimination ex ante.25 The second response focuses on improving antidiscrimination law’s ability to reach algorithmic discrimination ex post by
reinterpreting Title VII doctrine as applied to the context of algorithmic
discrimination.26
Each response is a well-researched and thoughtful way to approach a
difficult problem, and each stands to make an impact on the future of big
data at work. Yet each also carries with it a limitation: a lack of current enforceability. An ex ante focus on improving the algorithms requires a governance structure that makes employers mitigate a problem for which,
according to the solution’s proponents, employers likely cannot be held
liable under Title VII.27 An ex post focus on improving the law requires
unearthing new possibilities in Title VII doctrine that may run counter to
current court precedent.28
This Article challenges the assumptions underlying existing scholarship on algorithmic discrimination and offers a third possibility in response
to the problem. While the technology of algorithms and AI may be new, the
legal issues it raises are not. Algorithmic decision-making is just the latest
personnel management tool—not so different from past innovations like the
rise of personality testing in the 1980s and the use of executive recruiters
and staffing agencies in the 1990s.29 In the fifty-five years since Title VII

22. See infra Subpart I.B; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 677–93; Kim, DataDriven, supra note 13, at 883–92.
23. See infra Subpart I.B; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 694–713; Kim, DataDriven, supra note 13, at 901–04.
24. See infra Section I.B.1; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 714–28; Kroll et al.,
supra note 13, at 678–95.
25. See infra Section I.B.1; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 714–28; Kroll et al.,
supra note 13, at 678–95.
26. See infra Section I.B.2; see also Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 909–36.
27. See infra Section I.B.1.
28. See infra Section I.B.2; infra notes 124–25 (discussing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440
(1982) and the issue of a “bottom line” defense to Title VII).
29. See infra Subpart I.A.
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was enacted to prohibit employment discrimination, its doctrine has
adapted to reach increasingly more subtle and complex forms of discrimination. In particular, courts have recognized that employment decisions that
incorporate stereotypes associated with protected classes may be actionable, which raises new legal questions for the use of predictive algorithms.30
The Article identifies a gap in existing scholarship regarding the theoretical foundations underlying antidiscrimination law that, when filled,
suggests a new path forward. Both scholarly camps identify that Title VII
serves two main goals, each providing a theory of liability, yet neither effectively redressing the harm of algorithmic discrimination.31 On the one
hand, Title VII’s anticlassification goal requires formal equality and gives
rise to the disparate treatment framework of liability, under which discrimination occurs when an applicant or employee is intentionally treated differently than others based on protected class.32 On the other hand, Title
VII’s antisubordination goal seeks substantive equality and gives rise to the
disparate impact framework of liability, under which discrimination occurs
when applicants or employees are treated the same—in a “facially neutral”
manner—but the resulting outcomes have disproportionately negative results on certain protected classes.33 Current scholarship approaches algorithmic discrimination as primarily a problem of disparate impact because
it views algorithmic decision-making as a facially neutral practice applied
equally to all applicants or employees.34 Yet affirmative defenses available
to employers under current Title VII disparate impact doctrine mean that,
even if an employer’s use of algorithmic decision-making results in a disparate impact by protected class, the impact could be excused as “job related” and consistent with “business necessity,” making the employer likely to
prevail.35
But anticlassification and antisubordination are not the only theories
supporting Title VII. Existing scholarship overlooks an important third
principle of antidiscrimination law: its antistereotyping goal. Under the antistereotyping approach, the law requires not just equal treatment or equal
outcomes between protected groups but also individualized treatment even
within one protected group. Individuals may not be judged for employment
purposes based on stereotypes associated with a protected class. The stereotype framework of liability under Title VII is a particular species of claim
arising under the disparate treatment framework. While disparate treatment
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Part III.
See infra Subpart II.A.
See infra Subpart II.A.
See infra Subpart II.A.
See infra Subpart I.B.
See infra Subpart III.A.
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typically requires intentional discrimination, stereotype theory allows it to
reach intentional actions that incorporate or are infected by even unrecognized bias.36
Applying an antistereotyping lens to the issue of algorithmic decisionmaking calls into question the underlying “neutrality” of algorithms and the
big data on which they rely. This Article is the first to propose that some
algorithmic discrimination may be challenged as disparate treatment using
Title VII’s stereotype theory of liability. When an individual is judged negatively based on or by comparison to a body of group data, the individual
may have been unfairly stereotyped. Viewed this way, predictive analytics
that seek to judge and match individuals to a possibly biased model of a
“good employee” appear to be a form of stereotyping at hyperspeed. The
fact that a computer, instead of a human, does the stereotyping should not
insulate from liability the employer who relies on the stereotyped results if
the employer’s intentional use of an algorithm discriminates. Indeed, if AI
is meant to model human decision-making, but on an autonomous and massive scale, theories of liability that apply to human decision-making should
likewise apply.37
An antistereotyping approach also offers new lessons for preventing
algorithmic discrimination at work. Current legal scholarship has identified
how to reduce the data problems and discriminatory effects of algorithmic
decision-making, and an entire field of computer science is focused on the
technical aspects of this endeavor.38 Title VII’s antistereotyping principle
offers additional guidance—not just on how to de-bias algorithms themselves but on how to think about the uses for which algorithms are appropriate. Workplaces can use algorithms in a wide variety of ways, some of
which exacerbate reliance on stereotypes and others of which help counteract the effects of bias. The risk of liability for stereotyping may help discourage the former and encourage the latter. This could help shift the focus
from ensuring that algorithms do not result in new discrimination toward
fulfilling the promise of their design: to suppress human biases and increase diversity in hiring. It could help move beyond merely nondiscriminatory to actively antidiscriminatory algorithms.39
Framing algorithmic discrimination as a problem of stereotyping and
unequal treatment is also essential for redressing similar concerns outside
of the employment context and the protections of Title VII. One prominent
36. See infra Subpart II.B.
37. See infra Subparts II.B, III.B. But see Sullivan, supra note 13, at 8 (arguing that a computer
making decisions using AI “isn’t human, so it can’t ‘intend’ to discriminate,” as required for disparate
treatment liability).
38. See infra Section I.B.1.
39. See infra Subparts II.B, II.C.
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example is any challenge to the use of algorithms in the criminal justice
context raised under the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause,
which does not recognize liability under a disparate impact framework.40
This means that, should individuals wish to challenge, for example, predictive policing or algorithmic risk assessment for sentencing or probation,
they would have to be able to demonstrate that they experienced discriminatory treatment—not merely the discriminatory effects of a facially neutral practice. The antistereotyping principle applies equally to antidiscrimination law under Title VII and the Constitution; in fact, this principle originated in cases brought by individuals under the Equal Protection Clause to
challenge state and federal laws that enforced gender role stereotypes.41 To
the extent that algorithmic discrimination constitutes unlawful stereotyping
in the workplace, similar arguments may apply to algorithmic discrimination in other facets of life.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides some context for
the rise of big data at work and some background on current common uses
of algorithms in the workplace. It then summarizes existing scholarship on
the issue, including proposed solutions to remedy algorithmic discrimination at work through regulating to improve algorithms or re-envisioning the
reach of Title VII. Part II turns to the theories underlying antidiscrimination
law, first identifying the two main theories addressed in current scholarship, anticlassification and antisubordination, then introducing a third, the
antistereotyping principle. It also applies an antistereotyping lens to offer
perspective on how algorithms are used in the workplace, suggesting that
some uses are better than others for advancing racial and gender equality at
work. Part III examines whether algorithmic discrimination in employment
can be redressed under existing law, first revisiting existing arguments on
the limitations of current doctrine, then proposing that some types of algorithmic discrimination could constitute disparate treatment under a stereotype theory of liability. This Part concludes with possible implications for
algorithmic discrimination outside of the employment context, including
challenges to the use of algorithms in the criminal justice context brought
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Ultimately, the Article suggests that there is more room for redressing
algorithmic discrimination under existing law than others have identified
and more guidance to be gained from incorporating an antistereotyping
perspective into the current debate. A focus on the risks of technologyaided decision-making is important, but it need not overshadow the potential rewards: algorithms may incorporate structural biases, but they also
40. See infra Subpart III.C.
41. See infra Subpart II.B.
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suppress human biases. If both big data and diversity are important to the
employers of the future, an antistereotyping approach can help align the
two so that data helps, rather than hampers, greater workplace equality.
I. THE CHALLENGE OF ALGORITHMS AT WORK
Over the past decade, data analytics has made its way into human resources practices, raising concerns about the potential for data-based employment discrimination. This Part begins by providing some context and
background on the rise of and current uses for algorithms in workplace decision-making. It then summarizes current scholarship on the legal implications of algorithmic discrimination at work, including suggested responses
to the problem to date.
A. The Rise of Algorithms in the Workplace
1. Algorithmic Decision-Making: The Latest Personnel Management
Innovation
The current rise of data- and AI-based decision-making at work comes
within a long context of employer practices seeking to make better selection decisions faster and more cheaply.42 Since the passage of civil rights
laws, including Title VII, employers have had to incorporate a principle of
nondiscrimination into their processes. These and other legal and regulatory requirements on employers helped spur the growth of the human resources field and, with it, an ever-evolving series of tools designed to assist
employers.43 Over the past five decades, employers have adopted a variety
of practices for workforce management in areas like hiring, evaluation, and
promotion. Yet despite evolving practices, Title VII has been applied in
each era and to each practice. And where workforce management innovations concealed or exacerbated continuing discrimination, Title VII was
adapted to meet the challenge.44
In the early twentieth century, psychologists developed personality
tests that employers could use to evaluate applicants for qualities they de42. See, e.g., Bodie et al., supra note 20, at 964–68; Pernilla Bolander & Jörgen Sandberg, How
Employee Selection Decisions Are Made in Practice, 34 ORG. STUD. 285, 285–87 (2013) (describing
existing research since the 1970s that “has focused on developing and testing tools intended to improve
selection and make it more efficient”).
43. See generally FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2009) (documenting the
role of personnel professionals in putting antidiscrimination law into practice).
44. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971); Fact Sheet on Employment
Tests and Selection Procedures, EEOC [hereinafter Fact Sheet], https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/fact
employment_procedures.html (last modified Sept. 23, 2010).
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sired in employees.45 The field of personality testing grew over time, in part
to help assign soldiers to various duties during World Wars I and II.46 In
the late 1980s, employers’ use of personality testing to evaluate job applicants became widespread, with dozens of different types of tests in use.47
With the growth of this innovation came fears about its risks: commentators raised concerns about a variety of legal issues, including applicant privacy, due process, and discrimination.48 Yet antidiscrimination law
adapted. In caselaw, federal courts interpreted Title VII’s statutory language on “ability tests” to include coverage of potential discrimination in
employer personality testing.49 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the federal agency responsible for enforcing Title
VII, also weighed in, including its view that personality tests are among the
“employment tests and selection procedures” Title VII covers.50
Likewise, the concept of executive search originated in the midtwentieth century, but in the 1990s, employers began routinely outsourcing
the process of hiring to recruiters and staffing firms.51 Again, antidiscrimination law rose to the challenge. In caselaw, federal courts interpreted statutory language establishing that Title VII covers “employers” and
“employment agencies” to include relationships between staffing agencies
or recruiting firms and their employer clients.52 In 2006, the EEOC addressed the hiring trend in a section entitled “Recruitment” in its updated
Compliance Manual, citing earlier guidance and explaining the grounds
upon which recruiters and staffing firms could be held liable for their
own—or their employer-clients’—hiring discrimination.53
45. See Kimberli R. Black, Personality Screening in Employment, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 69, 71
(1994); Bodie et al., supra note 20, at 964–68.
46. See Black, supra note 45, at 71–72; Bodie et al., supra note 20, at 964–68.
47. See Black, supra note 45, at 76–80.
48. See id. at 90–120; Susan J. Stabile, The Use of Personality Tests as a Hiring Tool: Is the
Benefit Worth the Cost?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 299–308 (2002).
49. See Sujata S. Menjoge, Testing the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law: How Employers’ Use
of Pre-Employment Psychological and Personality Tests Can Circumvent Title VII and the ADA, 82
N.C. L. REV. 326, 335–36 (2003) (citing cases interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), including Colbert v.
H-K Corp., No. 11599, 1971 WL 215, at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 28, 1971)).
50. See Fact Sheet, supra note 44.
51. See, e.g., Rich Williams, The Evolution of Executive Search, https://charlesaris.com/evo
lution-executive-search/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) (noting that “‘[h]eadhunter’ [became] a household
word” in the “[l]ate 1980s/early 1990s,” due to “several high-profile CEO searches for IBM, Coca-Cola
and The Walt Disney Company”).
52. See, e.g., Reynolds v. CSX Transp., Inc., 115 F.3d 860, 869 n.12 (11th Cir. 1997), rev’d on
other grounds, 524 U.S. 947 (1998); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(b) (2012) (stating that Title VII
applies to “employment agencies”), 2000e(c) (defining “employment agency”).
53. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15, IV.A (Apr. 9,
2006) (citing U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF
EEO LAWS TO CONTINGENT WORKERS PLACED BY TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER
STAFFING FIRMS (Dec. 3, 1997)), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html; Michael Harris,
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While it poses some unique challenges, the rise of data-based analytics
and the use of AI in hiring is just the most recent innovation, making it part
of this same evolution. Indeed, even some types of algorithmic hiring tools
model earlier personality testing by using AI to measure cues from applicants that indicate desirable personality traits.54 As discussed in Subpart
I.B, current scholarship on algorithmic discrimination expresses concern
that Title VII may be unable to reach the discriminatory harms caused by
this innovation. Yet, as this Article argues, if the law of Title VII has been
able to adapt to reach earlier trends in employer hiring, there is reason to
believe it can adapt to reach current innovations, too.
2. Current Uses of Algorithms at Work
To date, employers have used algorithms and AI in a wide variety of
ways, and the legal implications depend on their use. Generally, when employers use algorithms, the goal is to gather and apply data to make decisions in a faster, more efficient, and more objective manner. Employers
may use algorithms to track productivity, assist with performance evaluations, evaluate compensation, determine necessary training, manage workplace benefits, and more.55 Yet, the most common use of algorithms in the
workplace, and the most directly relevant to the current debate over algorithmic discrimination, is in hiring. Over the past five years, dozens of
technology companies have been launched to offer data- or AI-based options for recruiting job applicants and making hiring decisions, now often
referred to as “talent acquisition.”56 While an algorithm is simply a computerized formula that can be designed to do whatever an employer asks of
it, the leading data-based recruitment services available to employers tend
to serve two main roles: either data mining and predictive matching or
skills-based testing and recruitment tracking.57
EEOC Is Watching You: Recruitment Discrimination Comes to the Forefront, ERE RECRUITING
INTELLIGENCE (May 30, 2006), https://www.ere.net/eeoc-is-watching-you-recruitment-discriminationcomes-to-the-forefront/.
54. Hilke Schellmann & Jason Bellini, Artificial Intelligence: The Robots Are Now Hiring,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/artificial-intelligence-the-robots-are-nowhiring-moving-upstream-1537435820 (describing how the companies DeepSense and HireVue are
using new tools to detect personality traits).
55. See, e.g., Josh Bersin, 9 HR Tech Trends for 2017, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Jan. 25,
2017), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/0217/pages/9-hr-tech-trends-for-2017.aspx.
56. See Jenny Roper, What Do We Mean When We Walk About Talent?, HR MAG. (June 15,
2015), http://www.hrmagazine.co.uk/article-details/what-do-we-mean-when-we-talk-about-talent.
57. Like Kim, I set aside the issue of third-party liability and focus on employer responsibility
for using a hiring process to make its decisions. See Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 916 (“[T]his
exploration focuses on employer liability, leaving aside the question whether vendors who create these
models and sell or license them to employers should bear any legal responsibility. . . . Regardless of
whether vendors are directly liable, employers who face potential legal responsibility will have an in-

BORNSTEIN FINAL3 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

Antidiscriminatory Algorithms

11/30/2018 2:11 PM

531

a. Mining-and-Matching Uses
The most prominent use of algorithms and AI in hiring is to mine
available data for potential applicants and predict who will succeed in a
given position based on matching applicants to a model employee. The
model employee is either specified by human programming or is constructed automatically by the algorithm searching for patterns from a set body of
data.58 As one provider of such a service, Infor Talent Management (Infor),
describes, its “cloud-based Predictive Talent Analytics . . . solution . . . leverag[es] large quantities of behavioral and performance data,” which it
“customize[s] into predictive models [that let businesses] better select, retain, and develop the right talent.”59 Infor claims to have access to 19% of
the U.S. workforce in its database and advertises that it weighs thirty-nine
behavioral characteristics in its algorithm.60
Likewise, a company called Entelo provides recruiting software that
mines and collects data on potential job applicants to help employers “efficiently discover and qualify talent.”61 Entelo explains that its search engine
“[f]ollow[s] the digital footprint of your candidates with social and professional information aggregated from over 50 sites across the web.”62
b. Testing-and-Tracking Uses
In contrast to data mining and predictive matching, other hiring algorithms focus on measuring applicants’ performance on skills-related challenges or tracking and improving upon employers’ own hiring practices. A
company called GapJumpers creates blind skills-based challenges for employers to use in evaluating candidates and uses algorithms to create and
rank applicant results.63 GapJumpers describes its “performance audition
challenges” as a way to “evaluate candidates on work performance . . . rather than keywords on a resume” to “avoid discarding desirable talent that
centive to pressure vendors to avoid biased outcomes.”). I also set aside what is known as the “cat’s
paw” problem, in which liability may attach when one decision maker unknowingly carries out the
intentional discrimination of a second, for whom the first has served as a “cat’s paw” (based on an
Aesop fable). See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415–16, 422–23, n.1 (2011). For a discussion
of liability issues related to third-party platforms and job advertisers, see generally Ajunwa, supra note
13, and Kim & Scott, supra note 13.
58. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 673–93.
59. Infor Talent Science, INFOR, https://www.infor.com/products/talent-science/ (last visited
Sept. 26, 2018).
60. Id.
61. Recruiting Information Software, ENTELO, https://www.entelo.com/products/ (last visited
Sept. 24, 2018).
62. Entelo Platform, HR.COM, https://www.hr.com/buyersguide/product/view/entelo_entelo_plat
form (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
63. Increase Diversity by Interrupting Hiring Bias, GAPJUMPERS, https://www.gapjumpers.me/
how-it-works/employers (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
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[does] not fit pre-conceived notions.”64 GapJumpers claims that its services
lead to “10% more diversity every quarter.”65
Another company, Textio, uses algorithms to improve companies’ job
postings “[b]y analyzing the hiring outcomes of more than 10 million job
posts a month [to] predict[] the performance of [the] listing” and providing
“real-time guidance” on improvement.66 Textio claims that, on average,
using their “augmented writing” algorithms to improve job postings allows
employers to “recruit 25% more people qualified enough to interview and
23% more women” and at a pace that is “17% faster” than without their
tools.67
c. Combined Uses
As uses of algorithms are endless, employers may also combine mining-and-matching with testing-and-tracking uses throughout the hiring process. For example, the company Talent Sonar focuses on five hiring
practices, including predictive analytics, to help employers “efficiently find
the person who best fits each job from a broader, more qualified candidate
pool.”68 While it offers “data-driven hiring decisions from [a scoring engine],” it also includes “blind resume review,” “inclusive job descriptions,”
“structured interviews,” and precommitment to hiring qualifications and
priorities up front.69 Talent Sonar claims that its process can “[a]ttract 30%
more qualified candidates.”70
***
Whether for mining and matching or testing and tracking, all hiring algorithms tend to incorporate some element of searching for patterns and
predicting outcomes in an effort to improve hiring decisions. And regardless of the method used, virtually all algorithmic recruiting services claim
to help an employer expand its pool of applicants—often with the stated
goal of improving racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in the employer’s
workforce.71 For that reason, algorithmic hiring stands to support broader
64. RESOURCE SOLUTIONS, RECRUITMENT OUTSOURCING INSIGHTS 18, https://www.robertwal
ters.com/content/dam/robert-walters/corporate/news-and-pr/files/whitepapers/resource-solutions-annual
-insights-report-11.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
65. GAPJUMPERS, https://www.gapjumpers.me (last visited Sept. 15, 2018).
66. Textio, WELCOMEAI, https://www.welcome.ai/products/human-resources-recruiting/textio
(last visited Sept. 24, 2018); see also Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 872.
67. Textio, supra note 66.
68. TALVISTA, ABOUT TALENT SONAR, http://tsarchive.talvista.com/wp-content/uploads/2017
/08/Talent-Sonar-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
69. Id.
70. Talent Sonar, TALVISTA, http://tsarchive.talvista.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
71. See supra notes 59–70 and accompanying text.
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workplace equality as compared to more traditional hiring methods. Yet, as
addressed in Part II, when it comes to the potential for discriminatory results, not all algorithms are created equal: the likelihood that algorithmic
hiring will result in discrimination varies based on both the type of algorithm and how it is used.
B. Existing Legal Scholarship on Algorithmic Discrimination at Work
Among legal scholarship on the rise of big data, a focus on algorithmic
discrimination is a more recent development. In just the past three years, a
handful of legal scholars have begun to focus on employment discrimination concerns raised by the use of algorithms at work.72 This Subpart describes current scholarship documenting the scope of the problem and two
distinct solutions to resolve it: improve the algorithms or improve the law.
While application of the law of Title VII to the problem of algorithmic
discrimination is explored more fully in Part III below, brief definitions are
needed to ground the discussion of the current scholarly debate. Under Title VII, employees who believe they have experienced race or sex discrimination in hiring can challenge the hiring decision using a disparate
treatment theory of liability, a disparate impact theory, or both.73 Employees allege disparate treatment when they believe that they were intentionally treated differently and experienced negative employment consequences
because of their protected class status.74 In contrast, they allege disparate
impact when they believe that an employer’s equal treatment of all employees resulted in disproportionately negative results for members of their
protected class.75 For the most part, current scholarship on algorithmic discrimination in the workplace characterizes the harm as one of disparate
impact and its solutions as shaped by disparate impact concepts—a characterization that, in Part III, this Article challenges.
1. The “Improve the Algorithms” Approach
In their germinal work on the subject, Big Data’s Disparate Impact,
Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst provide a comprehensive analysis of the
way in which the use of algorithms in the workplace can lead to discriminatory results.76 They then suggest that such discrimination will be difficult, if

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See supra notes 13, 20.
See infra Part III.
See infra Subpart III.B.
See infra Subpart III.A.
See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, 677–93.
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not impossible, to reach under the existing law of Title VII.77 As a result,
they propose a solution to the problem that focuses on regulating to improve the algorithms themselves, to reduce the incidence of algorithmic
discrimination in the first place.78
Barocas and Selbst identify five different ways in which algorithms
may be biased. As they explain, human programmers may inadvertently
introduce bias into a machine-learning algorithm when they identify the
goal the algorithm should seek to match (the “target variable”) or when
they provide it with sample data from which the algorithm “learns” the criteria in an applicant that matches the employer’s desired outcomes (the
“training data”).79 For example, if programmers train an algorithm to look
for “good employees” by correlating “good” with criteria that incorporated
bias in the past—such as past subjective performance assessments infected
by human bias—or if they ask an algorithm to determine its own pattern for
decision-making by matching past biased decisions—such as a data set in
which no applicants from historically black colleges were hired—these biases will be reproduced in all future decisions.80
Discrimination may also occur, they suggest, when data mining results
in “incorrect, partial, or nonrepresentative” data collection that disproportionately disadvantages certain protected classes, like racial minorities, who
have less access to technology from which accurate data may be mined.81
These inaccuracies are compounded by the fact that data mining generalizes from a limited sample set.82 In addition, discrimination may result from a
lack of a rich and specific set of decision-making factors.83 This leads algorithms to unintended discrimination in two ways: overascribing meaning to
each of a few data points from which broader generalizations are then
made,84 or relying on factors that effectively serve as a proxy for protected
classes based on correlations that exist in society at large.85 Lastly, Barocas
and Selbst suggest, employers who wish to commit intentional discrimination may do so by manipulating the data involved and “masking” their intentions with algorithmic “neutrality” (though they acknowledge that the
expense of such a cover-up makes it so unlikely as to be of little concern).86

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 694–714.
Id. at 714–22.
Id. at 677–81.
Id. at 677–84.
Id. at 684–87.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 691–92.
Id. at 688–90.
Id. at 691–92.
Id. at 692–93.

BORNSTEIN FINAL3 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

Antidiscriminatory Algorithms

11/30/2018 2:11 PM

535

Despite the many ways in which algorithmic decision-making may lead
to discriminatory results, as Barocas and Selbst view it, under existing antidiscrimination law, “some, if not most, instances of discriminatory data
mining will not generate liability.”87 Except for the unlikely case of an employer manipulating the data, they suggest that an employer cannot be held
liable for algorithmic discrimination under Title VII’s disparate treatment
framework.88 Disparate treatment requires proof of intentional discrimination, and by its very nature, Barocas and Selbst posit, algorithmic discrimination is “unintentional.”89 And, although algorithmic discrimination seems
to fit under Title VII’s disparate impact theory of liability, existing proof
structures mean that any disparate impact created by an algorithm may likely be excused under an employer’s affirmative defense of “business necessity.”90 In short, disparate treatment does not apply, and disparate impact
likely cannot be successfully proven, leaving plaintiffs without a remedy in
existing antidiscrimination law for documented patterns of algorithmic discrimination.91
As a result, Barocas and Selbst propose an alternative solution to redress algorithmic discrimination: focus on regulating the algorithms that
employers use to mitigate discriminatory effects from the outset.92 Noting
that computer scientists are working on technical fixes, they propose a
roadmap, grounded in antidiscrimination law, for reducing biased algorithms.93 In particular, Barocas and Selbst suggest that employers can set
better target variables by tightening the “nexus” between attributes that
serve as proxies and the skills required by the job, or by experimenting
with relying on a variety of different data points that give an accurate result
to see which reduces disparate impact.94 Employers can also attempt to improve training data, the authors suggest, by carefully removing data points
that incorporate past bias or by “oversampling” to correct past inaccuracies
where collected data is incomplete.95 Yet, Barocas and Selbst concede, both
options may prove technically challenging and possibly cost-prohibitive for

87. Id. at 675.
88. Id. at 694–701; infra Subpart III.A.
89. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 698 (“Except for masking, discriminatory data mining is
by stipulation unintentional.”).
90. Id. at 706–12; infra Subpart III.B.
91. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 675, 729 (“By now, it should be clear that Title VII,
and very likely other similarly process-oriented civil rights laws, cannot effectively address this situation [of data mining’s disparate impact].”).
92. Id. at 714–22.
93. Id. at 714.
94. Id. at 715–16.
95. Id. at 716–19.
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data miners.96 Ultimately, they conclude that there are few “obvious, complete, or welcome resolution[s]” to removing entirely the potential for disparate impacts of algorithmic decision-making, and that to do so “will
necessitate open-ended exploration without any way of knowing when analysts have exhausted the possibility for improvement.”97
While the challenge is steep and requires more than merely technical
solutions, the authors propose that regulating the process for use of algorithmic decision-making can help. In a second work on the topic, Accountable Algorithms,98 Barocas, Joshua Kroll, and coauthors develop what they
describe as “a new technological toolkit to verify that automated decisions
comply with key standards of legal fairness.”99 The authors provide an extensive explanation of how computer science tools can be used to reduce
unfairness in algorithmic decision-making, and they identify the need for a
governance structure in which law and policy makers work with computer
scientists to ensure fairness.100 In another work, Disparate Impact in Big
Data Policing,101 Selbst proposes one such model of algorithmic governance for the criminal justice context and beyond: requiring “algorithmic
impact statements” modeled on a similar approach in environmental law.102
Users of predictive algorithms would be required to document publicly the
expected effectiveness and potential disparate impacts of their technological choices and its reasonable alternatives, subject to public notice and
comment.103
Scholarship focusing on regulating to improve the algorithms has been
invaluable, both in identifying the sources of algorithmic discrimination
and, likely, as its most direct means of redress. Yet, without current enforceability, such proposals may fall short. The same scholars who aptly
identify the underlying unfairness in the data also suggest that fixing discriminatory algorithms will be difficult and expensive, without a guarantee
96. See id. Employers can also seek to incorporate more granular data to reduce statistical discrimination or to remove more data that correlates with protected classes. Again, however, these approaches have a downside: the potential for more unfairness or less accuracy. Id. at 719–22.
97. Id. at 716–18, 722.
98. Kroll et al., supra note 13.
99. Id. at 633, 695–705.
100. See id. at 695–705. This call for collaboration is well-supported: outside of the legal literature, computer scientists (including Barocas) have launched an entire field of research designed to detect and correct the disparate impacts of algorithms from a technical perspective. See, e.g., Philip Adler
et al., Auditing Black-Box Models for Indirect Influence, 54 KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYS. 95 (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10115-017-1116-3; Michael Feldman et al., Certifying and Removing Disparate Impact, ARXIV (July 16, 2015), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.3756.pdf. For a list of additional computer science scholarship on this topic, see Scholarship, FAT ML, https://www.fatml.org/resources/rele
vant-scholarship (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
101. See Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017).
102. Id. at 118–19, 168–82.
103. Id.
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of making the process more accurate or fair.104 At the same time, they
demonstrate that, in their view, an employer whose use of algorithms results in discrimination likely could be excused from liability under antidiscrimination law.105 If there is no potential for antidiscrimination liability,
then these proposals rely on employers complying with new regulations
without clear financial incentives to do so to achieve greater fairness that is
difficult to measure.106
2. The “Improve the Law” Approach
In the second foundational work in this area, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, Pauline Kim agrees with Barocas and Selbst about the potential risks of algorithmic discrimination but suggests an alternative solution:
improve antidiscrimination law to reach this new harm.107 To Barocas and
Selbst’s description of the five mechanisms for algorithmic discrimination,108 Kim adds her own catalogue of harms of using big data at work,
including intentional discrimination hiding behind a “legitimate business
reason” of “the output of a computer model”;109 individual record errors
that result in denial of employment opportunities; data-driven statistical
bias that “coincides with systematic disadvantage to protected classes”;110
and algorithms that, while not flawed themselves, nevertheless reproduce
structural disadvantage resulting in disparate impacts on protected classes.111
Like Barocas and Selbst, Kim questions whether current Title VII doctrine can address the unique challenges of algorithmic discrimination.112
Kim identifies only one type of algorithmic discrimination that “easily fits
within the conventional framework” of Title VII as disparate treatment:
when an employer uses a seemingly neutral data model to justify its intent

104. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 716–18.
105. See id. at 675, 729.
106. See Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 891–97 (describing how market-based solutions,
alone, will not fix the problem of algorithmic discrimination); id. at 894 (“[D]ata models are more likely to exhibit bias, and market competition will not reliably eliminate them. . . . [because] biased data
models may be accurate enough to persist in a competitive market, even though they are biased against
certain groups. . . . [F]eedback effects may appear to confirm the accuracy of biased data models, entrenching their use. . . . [B]iased data models may be efficient precisely because they are discriminatory,
and therefore pressures toward efficiency will not eliminate them.”).
107. See generally id.
108. See id. at 875–78.
109. Id. at 884.
110. Id. at 887.
111. See id. at 884–90.
112. Id. at 903.
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to discriminate.113 While this may not be easy for an employee to prove,
Kim notes, “[s]uch a scenario poses no particular conceptual challenge”
under current doctrine.114 Like Barocas and Selbst, Kim views all other algorithmic discrimination as a matter for disparate impact law and recognizes the challenges this poses for proving discrimination.115 As described in
Part III, an employer may prove, as an affirmative defense to a disparate
impact claim, that its practice is “job related” and “consistent with business
necessity” by validating the practice with proof that the practice is “statistically correlated” with success on the job.116 Because algorithms are designed to find statistical correlations, Kim argues, the traditional approach
to the question of business necessity becomes merely “tautological”—that
is, the algorithm can always serve as its own validation, even if it discriminates.117
Instead of looking for a regulatory solution focused on improving the
algorithms, however, Kim suggests that the law of Title VII may be read to
better meet the challenge of proving algorithmic disparate impact.118 Kim
argues that a close reading of the statutory text of Title VII suggests an asof-yet unrecognized prohibition on what she calls “classification bias”—
“the use of classification schemes that have the effect of exacerbating inequality or disadvantage along [the] lines of . . . protected characteristics.”119
Title VII doctrine could “directly prohibit” this sorting bias, Kim suggests,
or the current disparate impact framework could and should be altered in
four ways to redress algorithmic discrimination.120 First, employers should
be allowed to retain and use information on protected class status from datasets as needed to assess the risks of biased outcomes.121 Second, employees should be able to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact by
using the model’s training data rather than the law’s current approach of

113. Id.; infra Subpart III.B.
114. Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 865.
115. See id. at 902–09; infra Subpart III.A.
116. Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 866, 908.
117. Id. at 866, 908.
118. Id. at 869, 902.
119. Id. at 890–91, 911. Kim explains that classification bias is a form of disparate impact, not
disparate treatment, and distinct from anticlassification theory. Id. at 891–92 (“In speaking of classification bias, I do not mean to invoke what is sometimes referred to as ‘anticlassification’ theory. . . .
[which] identifies discriminatory harm primarily in the use of classifications—like race—to make decisions. . . . in contrast to antisubordination theory, which aims to promote equality by redressing structures and practices that disadvantage historically subordinated groups, regardless of [intent]. . . . [T]he
concept of classification bias proposed here looks at the consequences of employers’ decisions. By
asking whether neutral classification schemes work to systematically deprive already disadvantaged
groups of opportunities, it shares the concerns of antisubordination theorists.”).
120. See id. at 916–25.
121. See id. at 917–18.
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using “relevant labor market,” which—given that an algorithm assumes a
complete data universe—poses a major obstacle for employee proof.122
Third, an employer’s defense to a disparate impact should require more
than statistical correlation: the employer should be required to show that
“no problems exist with the data or model construction that are biasing the
results.”123 Lastly, employers who detect and correct algorithmic bias in
their own decision-making processes should be able to rely on a “bottomline” defense that their ultimate decisions show no discrimination124—an
approach that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in the 1980 case Connecticut v. Teal.125
In a later piece responding to Kroll and his coauthors’ deep dive into
technological efforts to correct the algorithms, Kim reinforced her belief in
the importance of antidiscrimination law’s norms in redressing algorithmic
discrimination.126 While, as Kroll and his coauthors suggest, transparency
and auditing of algorithms is only a limited solution (relative to other forms
of governance) from the perspective of computer science, Kim noted its
importance from the perspective of law, explaining that “[t]echnical tools
alone cannot reliably prevent discriminatory outcomes because the causes
of bias often lie not in the code, but in broader social processes.”127
As with the scholars focused on regulatory solutions to improve algorithms, Kim’s work, focused on improving antidiscrimination law itself,
both adds to our understanding of the problem of algorithmic discrimination and proposes a thoughtful vision for redressing it. Were Kim’s proposals to be adopted by courts applying Title VII, algorithmic
discrimination would, no doubt, decrease. Yet like Barocas and Selbst’s,
Kim’s approach is limited by its current enforceability; even Kim suggests
that, while possible under Title VII as enacted, her proposal requires “fundamentally rethinking antidiscrimination doctrine.”128
***
Both the “improve the algorithms” and “improve the law” approaches
have put the issue of algorithmic employment discrimination on the map

122. See id. at 918–20.
123. Id. at 920–23.
124. See id. at 923–25.
125. 457 U.S. 440, 445–56 (1982). But see Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 924–25 (arguing
that this defense makes sense in the context of classification bias because it will incentivize “equalitypromoting uses of data” by “encourag[ing] employers to audit the impact of . . . decision-making algorithms . . . to create processes that produce less biased results overall”).
126. See Kim, Auditing Algorithms, supra note 13, at 189–91, 202–03.
127. See id. at 191.
128. Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 865.
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and offered compelling proposals to redress this issue. Yet both approaches
start from the assumption that antidiscrimination law involves only two
theoretical paths: formal equality or substantive equality. Part II of this Article identifies a third principle key to the theoretical framework underlying
antidiscrimination law—individual freedom from stereotypes—and raises
its practical implications for big data at work. Part III then revisits remedying algorithmic discrimination under existing law using an antistereotyping
approach.
II. ALIGNING ALGORITHMS WITH ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW THEORY
Scholarship on algorithmic discrimination at work has centered on the
inability of the law to redress the problem under either of two main theories
underlying antidiscrimination law: the anticlassification goal that requires
formal equal treatment and the antisubordination goal that seeks substantive equality of opportunities and outcomes. This Part explains that there is
a third theory behind antidiscrimination law unexplored in the current debate: an antistereotyping goal that requires not just equal but also individual
treatment, which may offer additional guidance on the use of algorithms in
the workplace.
A. Anticlassification and Antisubordination Theories
Jurists and scholars have wrestled with the principles that should guide
antidiscrimination jurisprudence for the past half-century. This debate developed in the context of how best to ensure the constitutional guarantee of
Equal Protection after the Brown v. Board of Education129 decision desegregated public education in 1954.130 With the passage of Title VII in 1964,
the same questions arose about applying the statutory law to employment
discrimination.131 Both scholarship and caselaw on the topic reflect a tension between what are recognized as the two main theories for achieving
equality: anticlassification theory and antisubordination theory.132

129. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
130. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9–11 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1470, 1470–76 (2004).
131. See Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law,
63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 994 (2012).
132. A large body of scholarship addresses this question, a full discussion of which is beyond the
scope of this Article. See generally, e.g., Areheart, supra note 131; Balkin & Siegel, supra note 130;
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003
(1986); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Bar-
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An anticlassification approach (also known as antidifferentiation) focuses on formal equality and equal treatment of individuals.133 It defines
discrimination as actions that treat individuals differently from one another
based on protected class, viewing any acknowledgement of those differences as perpetuating discrimination.134 In an anticlassification approach to
equality, the goal is “colorblindness”—that the law should entirely ignore
protected class status.135 For example, in a 2007 Supreme Court decision
striking down the use of race as a factor in assigning students to specific
schools within a public school district to achieve racial diversity, Chief Justice John Roberts opined, “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”136 Such an approach
would treat all individuals the same, regardless of the fact that individuals
to whom the same treatment is applied start from different positions of social status and advantage.137
An antisubordination approach (also known as antisubjugation) focuses
on substantive equality and both equal opportunities and equal outcomes
between groups.138 It defines discrimination as actions that perpetuate social hierarchy and the oppression of historically disadvantaged groups.139
Antisubordination theory recognizes that the law must consider how members of protected classes are situated differently within society based on the
historical context of the social-status subordination of racial minorities and
women.140 For example, in his partial dissent from a 1978 decision on the
use of race in public university medical school admissions to achieve racial
diversity, Justice Harry Blackmun explained, “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race[;]. . . in order to treat some persons
equally, we must treat them differently.”141 This approach views formal
equal treatment as insufficient to root out discrimination because, if racial

bara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Siegel, supra note 130;
Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011).
133. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 130, at 9–11; Colker, supra note 132, at 1005–06.
134. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 130, at 9–11; Colker, supra note 132, at 1005–06.
135. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 130, at 9–11; Colker, supra note 132, at 1005–06.
136. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007); see
also Stacy L. Hawkins, A Deliberate Defense of Diversity: Moving Beyond the Affirmative Action Debate to Embrace a 21st Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 75, 90–98 (2012).
137. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 130, at 9–11; Colker, supra note 132, at 1005–10.
138. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 130, at 9–11; Colker, supra note 132, at 1007–10.
139. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 130, at 9–11; Colker, supra note 132, at 1007–10.
140. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 130, at 9–11; Colker, supra note 132, at 1007–10.
141. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); see also Hawkins, supra note 136, at 96.
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or gender minorities start from a disadvantaged position and are treated the
same as more advantaged majorities, they will remain in a lower status position in perpetuity.142
The same theories of equality apply whether an antidiscrimination
claim arises under constitutional law (Equal Protection) or under statutory
employment law (Title VII); yet their role in the legal doctrine varies.143 As
explored in Part III, caselaw interpreting the Equal Protection Clause has,
for the most part, limited its doctrine to an anticlassification approach.144
Plaintiffs alleging protected class discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause may only pursue claims of unequal treatment; no disparate impact
theory of liability is available.145 In contrast, Title VII recognizes both the
anticlassification principle, in its prohibition of disparate treatment,146 and
the antisubordination principle, in its prohibition of unjustified disparate
impact.147
In the context of algorithmic discrimination, current scholarship focuses on the inability of anticlassification and antisubordination approaches to
encompass the problem.148 Because they view the use of algorithmic decision-making as a “neutral” employment practice, scholars agree that any
resulting discrimination is primarily an issue of disparate impact that implicates antisubordination goals, rather than disparate treatment that implicates anticlassification goals.149 They also agree that the disparate impact
142. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 130, at 9–11; Colker, supra note 132, at 1005–10.
143. Since an amendment to Title VII in 1972 that extended the statute to cover state and federal
governments, public sector employees may pursue an employment discrimination claim under either
Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause. See generally Stephen M. Rich, One Law of Race?, 100 IOWA
L. REV. 201 (2014) (discussing points of “convergence” and “divergence” between Title VII and Equal
Protection doctrine).
144. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); infra Subpart III.C. But see Balkin &
Siegel, supra note 130, at 10–11 (suggesting that antisubordination principles are still present in the
Court’s application of strict scrutiny to facial discrimination in the context of affirmative action);
Siegel, supra note 130, at 1541–42 (“It is generally assumed that when the Court required plaintiffs
challenging facially neutral state action to prove discriminatory purpose, it was embracing anticlassification values and repudiating antisubordination values. Yet[,] . . . [in] the Court’s affirmative action
cases[,] . . . the judiciary has developed the concept of discriminatory purpose with sensitivity to the
social status of groups that government benefits and burdens . . . [E]ven in the area of discriminatory
purpose doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted in ways that vindicate concerns
about group subordination. . . . [C]oncerns about subordination shape the concept of classification itself.”).
145. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 242–52.
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
800–01 (1973); infra Subpart III.B.
147. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); infra Subpart III.A.
148. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 723–28; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 891–
92.
149. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 723–28; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 891–
92; Kroll et al., supra note 13, at 692–94.
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doctrine that animates antisubordination theory comes with a proof structure and affirmative defenses that could allow employers to escape liability
for algorithmic discrimination at work.150
Commentators disagree, however, about the application of the antisubordination principle in Title VII jurisprudence to algorithmic hiring decisions. The debate centers on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in
Ricci v. DeStefano, in which the Court held that, where an employer threw
out the results of a promotion exam that it believed had created a disparate
impact on black and Latino applicants, those (mostly white) individual employees who would have been promoted had the exam been certified could
allege disparate treatment.151 Barocas and Selbst along with Kroll and his
coauthors express concern that the Ricci holding might limit employers’
ability to improve upon their own algorithms if they detect a resulting disparate impact because, once an algorithm is applied, rejecting its decisions
could amount to Ricci-style disparate treatment against those whom the
algorithm favors.152 In contrast, Kim explains that such a scenario would be
factually distinct from Ricci, in which, but for the employer’s rejection of
the exam results, the specific plaintiffs who brought the lawsuit were guaranteed promotion based on a pre-set plan under a union contract.153 As Kim
rightly observes, because no particular applicants would be identified and
guaranteed a job as a result of an employer merely using a hiring algorithm,
Ricci would pose no obstacle to the employer improving upon its own algorithm should it detect disparate effects.154
Regardless of the difference in interpretation of Ricci, however, the
scholarly disagreement focuses solely on whether and how the antisubordination approach could apply to algorithmic discrimination. Both views
share the same starting assumption that antisubordination is the appropriate
theoretical frame for the problem.

150. See infra Subpart III.A.
151. 557 U.S. 557, 576–93 (2009).
152. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 724–28; Kroll et al., supra note 13, at 692–94.
153. See Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 925–32.
154. See id. (“Unlike the situation in Ricci, prohibiting the use of a biased algorithm does not
constitute a disparate treatment violation because there has been no adverse employment action. No
employee has been deprived of a job to which he is entitled because no employee has any right or legitimate expectation that an employer will use any particular model. . . . Because disparate treatment violations occur only when employees’ legitimate entitlements are disrupted, nothing in Ricci . . .
prohibit[s] employer attempts to identify and avoid such bias. . . . An employer might not be permitted
to fire an employee solely because she was selected using a biased data model. However, Title VII
should not be read to prohibit the employer from ceasing to use that model once it discovers the bias.”).
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B. Antistereotyping Theory
For decades, the debate over how to balance anticlassification and antisubordination principles has dominated much of the discussion of antidiscrimination law. Yet there is a third goal reflected in both the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII that is directly relevant to the issue of algorithmic discrimination: the antistereotyping principle, which requires that
people be treated not only equally but also individually under the law.155
An anticlassification approach requires formal equal treatment of individuals who are members of different groups. An antisubordination approach
seeks to equalize opportunities or outcomes between members of different
groups. In contrast, an antistereotyping approach requires individual treatment even within one’s own group. It is, in part, a subspecies of anticlassification theory in that one way to treat everyone equally is to treat each of
us as an individual.156 But it also, independently, does more: it requires that
individuals not be held to or judged against stereotypes associated with any
protected classes, including those protected classes to which they belong.157
Anticlassification requires that we treat Woman A and Man B the same,
and antisubordination requires that we ensure that All Women are not disadvantaged as compared to All Men. But antistereotyping also requires that
we treat Woman A as an individual and not make work-related judgments
about her as compared to All Women.
A focus on individualized treatment has long been a part of both Equal
Protection and Title VII jurisprudence. In the constitutional context, the
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the language of the Four155. See Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Conflicts of
Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1301–12 (2012) [hereinafter Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping]; Stephanie
Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
919, 937–42 (2016) [hereinafter Bornstein, Unifying]; Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1354–58 (2012); Cary Franklin, The AntiStereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 120 (2010)
[hereinafter Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping]. Note that Reva Siegel has proposed her own third principle
guiding modern Equal Protection Law, which she terms “antibalkanization”—a discussion of which is
beyond the scope of this Article. See Siegel, supra note 130, at 1281–82 (“Over the decades, observers
of the Court have come to describe the dispute in binary terms[:]. . . a colorblind anticlassification principle, premised on the belief that the Constitution protects individuals, not groups, and so bars all racial
classifications, except as a remedy for specific wrongdoing [versus] . . . an antisubordination principle
that identifies racial stratification (rather than classification) as the wrong and endeavors to rectify the
forms of group inequality that race-based and race-salient policies have caused. . . . [T]his binary
framework obscures the views of the Justices [in the middle,] who . . . reason from an . . . independent
view more concerned with social cohesion than with colorblindness.”).
156. See Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 671, 687,
718–21 (2013) (suggesting that stereotyping is “a technology of actionable discrimination” held to be
unlawful where it constrains individuals’ freedom).
157. See Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping, supra note 155; Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155, at
937–42; Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 88, 90–91.
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teenth Amendment that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”158 as “personal rights” that are
“guaranteed to the individual.”159 Under Title VII, the statutory text itself
focuses on the individual, making it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual” or “deprive any individual of employment opportunities.”160 The Court has interpreted Title VII to protect an individual
against protected class discrimination even when other members of the protected class, or the protected class as a whole, may not have suffered
harm.161
The idea that individualized treatment also protects individuals from
being held to stereotypes associated with their own protected class first appeared in Equal Protection cases.162 In a series of cases—litigated by Ruth
Bader Ginsburg throughout the 1970s in her then-role as the Director of the
Women’s Rights Project of the ACLU—the Supreme Court established that
antidiscrimination law also served an antistereotyping purpose.163 The
Court held that state laws could not establish rules that support gender role
stereotypes, thereby punishing individual men who did not behave like other men or individual women who did not behave like other women.164 During this time, the Court invalidated state or federal laws that recognized that
men were preferable to women as estate administrators for deceased family
members;165 allowed women, but not men, a caregiver’s tax deduction;166
required only men, and not women, to prove dependency on their spouses
to receive military or social security survivor benefits;167 and denied social
security benefits to the children of widowed men, but not of widowed

158. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
159. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (first citing McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161–62 (1914); then citing Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,
351 (1938); and then citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
161. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455–56 (1982) (rejecting the “bottom line”
defense).
162. See Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 1301–12; Franklin, AntiStereotyping, supra note 155, at 84–88.
163. See Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 1301–12; Franklin, AntiStereotyping, supra note 155, at 119–42.
164. See Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 1301–12; Franklin, AntiStereotyping, supra note 155, at 119–42.
165. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971); Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping, supra note 155, at
1302–04.
166. Moritz v. Comm’r, 469 F.2d 466, 470 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973);
Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 1304–06.
167. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216–17 (1977) (social security benefits); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688–91 (1973) (military housing and medical benefits); Bornstein, Gender
Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 1306–09.
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women.168 Through this series of cases, the Court established that applying
laws that incorporated stereotypes associated with gender roles to individuals constituted disparate treatment in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
In the four decades since, the Court has reinforced and extended the antistereotyping approach to Equal Protection when state actors assume that
individuals will or should conform to their protected class stereotype.169 In
1982, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court sided with a
male plaintiff who sought admission to the state’s female-only nursing
school.170 In invalidating the school’s exclusive admissions policy, the
Court explained that it “perpetuate[d] the stereotyped view of nursing as an
exclusively woman’s job[,] . . . lend[ing] credibility to the old view that
women, not men, should become nurses, and mak[ing] the assumption that
nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy.”171 In 1994, in
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., the Court held that, in a paternity and child
custody suit, a state prosecutor’s use of preemptory challenges to disqualify
all male potential jurors based on the assumption that individual female
jurors would be more sympathetic to the mother constituted unconstitutional sex discrimination.172 Noting that it was “reaffirm[ing] what, by now,
should be axiomatic,” the Court explained that “discrimination [that] serves
to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about
the relative abilities of men and women” violates Equal Protection.173 In
United States v. Virginia, a 1996 decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court held that a state military college could not constitutionally exclude
women from admission by “rely[ing] on overbroad generalizations about
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females” when
hundreds of individual women had applied for admission.174 And in 2003,
in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court held that a
man who was fired while on leave to care for his injured wife could sue his
public employer under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act because
the statute was enacted to remedy sex discrimination by providing family
leave to both men and women so as to overcome “mutually reinforcing
[gender] stereotypes” and “a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that
forced women . . . [into] the role of primary family caregiver” and men out

168. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 650–53 (1975); Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping,
supra note 155, at 1309–12.
169. See Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 142–72.
170. 458 U.S. 718, 729–30 (1982).
171. Id.
172. 511 U.S. 127, 137–46 (1994).
173. Id. at 130–31.
174. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); see also Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 143–46.
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of it.175 Beyond the Supreme Court, several federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals have now applied the antistereotyping approach to
Equal Protection to strike down a wide array of state actions that punish
individuals for failure to conform to gender stereotypes.176
In the context of Title VII, references to protected class stereotypes appeared in employment cases throughout the 1970s as well.177 In an early
and influential case, Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,178 the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employer could not require
female employees to contribute more than male employees to its pension
fund, despite the fact that women lived longer than men on average and,
therefore, received greater pension payouts.179 Noting that “employment
decisions cannot be predicated on mere ‘stereotyped’ impressions about the
characteristics of males or females,” the Court explained that assuming any
one individual would meet the stereotype of the group violated the law.180
“The statute’s focus on the individual is unambiguous,” the Court explained; thus, “[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an insufficient
reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not
apply.”181
Then, in 1989, in the case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,182 the Court
first articulated what has become known as the “stereotype theory” of liability under Title VII. Plaintiff Ann Hopkins sued her employer, a top accounting firm, for sex discrimination after she was passed over for
promotion to partner.183 Hopkins had been an outstanding employee with
175. 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); see also Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 149–54.
176. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that a state employer’s termination of a transgender employee whose sex assigned at birth was male was a penalty for
failure to conform to masculine gender stereotype, in violation of Equal Protection Clause); Smith v.
City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 636–37
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a state employer’s denial of “primary caregiver” leave to a male employee
violated the Equal Protection Clause, like other “[g]ender classifications based upon generalizations
about typical gender roles in the raising and nurturing of children” (first citing Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979); and then citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972))); Free the Nipple v. City
of Fort Collins, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1133 (D. Colo. 2017) (holding that a municipal ordinance penalizing women, but not men, for exposing their breasts in public likely violated Equal Protection Clause
because it was “based on an impermissible gender stereotype that results in a form of gender-based
discrimination”), appeal filed, No. 17-1103 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2017).
177. See, e.g., City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704–11 (1978);
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
178. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 702.
179. Id. at 704–11.
180. Id. at 707–08.
181. Id. at 708.
182. 490 U.S. 228, 235, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded in part by statute on other
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012), as recognized in Burrage
v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 n.4 (2014).
183. Id. at 231–32.
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superior qualifications, but she was criticized for failing to conform to assumptions about how, as a woman, she should behave at work.184 The decision makers criticized Hopkins for being too “aggressive,” “macho,” and
“masculine,” and suggested that she should look and behave more “femininely” if she wanted to be selected for partnership.185 The Court held in
Hopkins’s favor, finding that the assessment of her work performance was
impermissibly influenced by gender stereotypes.186 As the Court explained,
“[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”187
In the three decades since the Price Waterhouse decision, the stereotype theory of liability has become a significant part of Title VII jurisprudence.188 While evidence on the operation of stereotypes has played a role
in countless Title VII cases, the antistereotyping principle in Title VII has
been particularly recognized by courts where plaintiffs allege discrimination on the basis of family caregiving responsibilities or transgender status.189 Many federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals have
applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse theory to hold that,
when employees are penalized at work based on stereotypes about how
they will or should behave, that constitutes disparate treatment.190 Courts
have held that, when a female employee is denied a promotion or otherwise
penalized at work based on assumptions related to her status as a mother—
for example, that she will be (or should be) less committed to or focused on
work—an employer has violated Title VII’s prohibition of disparate treatment under a stereotype theory.191 Likewise, courts have held that an employer violates Title VII when it fires or otherwise penalizes transgender
employees based on assumptions related to their gender presentation—that

184. Id. at 235, 250–55.
185. Id. at 235.
186. Id. at 255–58.
187. Id. at 251 (citations omitted).
188. See generally Bernstein, supra note 156 (analyzing stereotype theory under Title VII);
Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155 (same); Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L.
REV. 591 (2011) (same); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at
Work, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 757 (2013) (same); see also Franklin, Anti-Stereotyping, supra note 155
(analyzing stereotype theory under Equal Protection).
189. See cases cited infra notes 191–92; see also Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155, at 937–42;
Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping, supra note 155, at 1301–12.
190. See cases cited infra notes 191–92; see also Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155, at 937–42,
962–63 (describing prescriptive and descriptive stereotyping); Bornstein, Gender Stereotyping, supra
note 155, at 1301–12.
191. See, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 n.4, 48 (1st Cir. 2009); Back v.
Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2004).
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is, assumptions that a person whose sex assigned at birth was male should
look or behave according to masculine gender stereotypes.192
Along with antisubordination and anticlassification, the antistereotyping principle is now a well-developed theory in antidiscrimination law,
arising in cases brought under both the Equal Protection Clause and Title
VII. In the context of algorithmic discrimination, two pieces of stereotype
doctrine are of particular importance. First, while case law has developed
mostly in the context of sex stereotyping, courts have not so limited the
theory, which applies to race, sex, and other protected classes equally under
both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.193 While alleged less often,
employee plaintiffs can and do succeed on claims of racial stereotyping
under Title VII.194
Second, in cases brought under a stereotype theory, courts have made
clear that a plaintiff may make out a case of disparate treatment even without providing what is known as “comparator evidence”—evidence that others who were similarly situated outside of the relevant protected class were
treated better.195 The so-called comparator requirement grew out of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s statement in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green—the
original case laying out disparate treatment theory under Title VII—in
which the Court stated that, to prove race discrimination, evidence of a
similarly situated white employee who was treated better than the black
plaintiff would be “[e]specially relevant.”196 Despite several later statements by the Court clarifying that such evidence was not required, some
lower courts continue to misapply the original holding, requiring a plaintiff
to provide comparator evidence to prevail.197 In cases alleged under a ste192. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2018),
petition for cert. filed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 20, 2018); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320–21
(11th Cir. 2011); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737–38 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004). But see Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221–
22, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that “sex” under Title VII does not encompass transgender status
discrimination, without addressing gender nonconformity under a sex stereotyping theory).
193. See Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155, at 941 n.118; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139–40 (1994) (holding that “gross generalizations” are constitutionally impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause, whether made on the basis of race or gender); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251–52 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that, in a Title VII case,
“[b]y focusing on Hopkins’ specific proof . . . we do not suggest a limitation on the possible ways of
proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision”), superseded in part by
statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012), as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 n.4 (2014).
194. See Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155, at 963–72 (citing, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999); Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765
(E.D. Wis. 2010)).
195. Id.
196. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973); see also Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155, at 942–45.
197. See Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155, at 942–45.
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reotype theory, however, numerous courts have established that a plaintiff
may make out a case of disparate treatment under stereotype theory without
comparator evidence because, where a work-related decision is made on
the basis of a stereotype associated with a protected class, that “can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, [protected class]based motive.”198 This makes doctrinal sense: if antistereotyping requires
that we treat Woman A as an individual rather than as a member of All
Women, comparator evidence to Man B or to All Men is irrelevant.
As discussed in Part III, the ability to argue a stereotyping theory for
disparate treatment based on any protected class and without having to provide comparator evidence may help victims of algorithmic discrimination,
for whom such evidence is unavailable. Moreover, the antistereotyping
principle offers an important additional perspective from which to consider
the use of algorithms at work.
C. Lessons from Theory: Toward Antidiscriminatory Algorithms
As described in Part I, how algorithms are designed and used to help
employers recruit and hire varies, which means the possibility that they will
lead to discriminatory results will vary as well. Focusing on anticlassification and antisubordination theories is helpful for identifying how algorithms discriminate and how to make them less discriminatory. Including
antistereotyping theory takes this analysis one step further, to offer lessons
not just for preventing algorithms from actively discriminating, but also for
using algorithms in a way that actually improves upon current human decision-making—to make them affirmatively antidiscriminatory.
Despite their concerns that structural bias is the greater risk, current
scholars do recognize that the use of algorithms offers the potential to reduce human cognitive biases and widen candidate pools.199 For this reason,
they also suggest that, in addition to improving the algorithms or the law
itself, employers should change the ways in which they use algorithms to
greater support Title VII’s antisubordination goals.200 Barocas and Selbst
agree that, by understanding the potential for algorithmic discrimination,
employers can improve their models to reduce their disparate impacts by
“mak[ing] more effective use of the tools that computer scientists have begun to develop.”201 Kim offers that workforce analytics “can be a useful
198. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2004);
see also Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155, at 944–50.
199. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 673–74, 731–32; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13,
at 869–71.
200. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 720–23.
201. Id. at 731–32.
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tool for diagnosing both cognitive and structural forms of bias.”202 Citing
Textio—the algorithm that detects biased language in job postings—as an
example, Kim suggests that, instead of relying on data tools to make employment-related decisions, employers could use them to analyze the “decision-making process itself,” with the potential to discover and correct
“hidden biases.”203 Whether data is helpful or harmful, Kim suggests, “depends a great deal on how the algorithms are constructed and deployed.”204
Adding an antistereotyping lens to the issue of algorithmic decisionmaking at work offers another benefit: it may help sort stereotypeactivating uses of algorithms from stereotype-suppressing uses, even when
the antisubordination principle seems met. Mining-and-matching uses of
algorithms appear to be the most likely to rely on stereotypes because, as
described in Part III, predictive matching algorithms judge individuals
against a model employee that may incorporate protected class stereotypes.
Yet if a mining-and-matching use of an algorithm is combined with the
specific goal of increasing workforce diversity, it may ultimately result in
bottom-line employment decisions that meet an antisubordination goal.205
This may obscure the fact that the algorithm itself relies on potentially
questionable stereotyping.
For example, Entelo advertises that its predictive matching algorithm
allows employers to highlight diverse candidates to increase workforce racial or gender diversity.206 Among the data it mines, Entelo also provides a
“More Likely To Move™” feature, which it claims spots applicants with a
likelihood of changing jobs “within the next 90 days.”207 The ability to
change jobs—particularly if it requires geographic relocation—is a factor
that may disadvantage women in relation to men, based on women’s greater family caregiving responsibilities and, if relevant, reliance on a male

202. Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 871–72 (emphasis omitted).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 874.
205. Cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (explaining lack of a “bottom line” defense).
206. Diversity Recruiting Software, ENTELO, https://www.entelo.com/products/platform/diver
sity/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Entelo Diversity, ENTELO, https://www.entelo.com/wp-content/up
loads/2017/09/diversity_DS-6.27.16.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) (“Entelo’s proprietary algorithm
[helps companies] . . . [f]ind candidates from underrepresented groups based on gender, race/ethnicity,
and veteran status[.] . . . Entelo Diversity allows companies of all sizes to reap the benefits of building
strong, diverse teams. Additionally, since information is layered on top of a candidate’s skill-set, the
solution provides a level of objectivity as it relates to your hiring practices.”).
207. Recruiting Automation Platform, ENTELO, https://www.entelo.com/products/platform/
(“Focus your efforts where it counts. Entelo analyzes dozens of variables to predict candidates’ receptiveness to new opportunities. Candidates who are More Likely To Move™ are 2X more likely to make
change within the next 90 days, than other candidates.” (emphasis omitted)) (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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partner’s job income.208 An unstated requirement that applicants leave a
current job to take the one for which they applied is not actionable under
Title VII, and a stated requirement that, to be hired or promoted, applicants
must be willing to relocate multiple times might be actionable only as disparate impact; neither raises any issue of stereotyping. But an unspoken
and unstated assumption that an individual applicant is unlikely to move in
the future based on data by comparison to past group behavior, which
preemptively knocks the applicant out from consideration, raises a potential
issue of stereotyping. If women as a group tend to change jobs less, and
algorithms look for patterns among group data, then any individual applicant who looks like a woman may be excluded from consideration on the
assumption that she will not change jobs in the future. She may be disadvantaged in relation both to men and to women whose past work behavior
conforms to a stereotypically masculine career trajectory. If the candidate is
qualified, the employer should ask her about the likeliness of moving, rather than having an algorithm “predict” (that is, “assume”) the answer
based on future conformity to past behavior—just as in Manhart, the employer could not predict that any individual woman would live longer than
a man based on past group data.209 Even if, at the end of the process, the
employer hires a woman—thus meeting an antisubordination goal—the
antistereotyping goal can help flag that incorporating this factor into an
algorithm might be problematic.
Likewise, applying stereotype theory helps identify that testing-andtracking uses of algorithms may be more likely than mining-and-matching
uses of algorithms to suppress protected class stereotypes and human cognitive biases. Instead of solely expanding a pool of candidates and allowing
employers to ultimately factor in diversity, both GapJumpers and Textio
adopt strategies known from social science research to help reduce the operation of stereotypes: “blinding” decision makers to candidates’ protected
class status and “interrupting” actions that may unknowingly incorporate
bias.210 GapJumpers was, in fact, modeled on a famous study documenting
how blind auditions can reduce the operation of sex-based stereotypes in

208. See Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market at Wal-Mart, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 759,
759–60 (2013).
209. See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704–11 (1978); text
accompanying supra notes 177–81.
210. See Joan C. Williams, Hacking Tech’s Diversity Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/10/hacking-techs-diversity-problem; Bias Interrupters, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW:
UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF THE LAW, http://worklifelaw.org/projects/bias-interrupters (last
visited Sept. 10, 2018); Fall 2017 Corporate Program Meeting Recap, VMWARE WOMEN’S
LEADERSHIP INNOVATION LAB: STANFORD UNIV., https://womensleadership.stanford.edu/blueprint (last
visited Sept. 10, 2018).
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hiring decisions.211 Similarly, TalentSonar’s feature to help employers
“precommit” to stated hiring criteria was based on studies documenting
how selection criteria may shift over time, often unintentionally, to favor
those criteria held by candidates in dominant protected classes.212
Whether an algorithm could result in exacerbating or, alternatively, reducing protected class biases will depend on both how it is created and how
it is used. Certainly any attempt to reduce human decision-making and
widen and diversify pools of job candidates could do more to serve Title
VII’s antidiscrimination goals than relying on traditional hiring methods.
But considering Title VII’s antistereotyping principle also offers important
lessons for suppressing the operation of biases and stereotypes within algorithmic decision-making that may escape detection with only a bottom-line
focus on antisubordination principles.
III. REMEDYING ALGORITHMIC DISCRIMINATION UNDER EXISTING LAW
Considering antidiscrimination theory as a way to improve algorithms
and the uses to which they are applied in the workplace, while useful, is not
enough to spark needed change. To that end, this Part revisits the idea of
employer liability for algorithmic discrimination under existing antidiscrimination law. Current scholarship characterizes algorithmic discrimination as mainly a problem of disparate effects yet also suggests that it could
escape the reach of disparate impact doctrine. This Part questions both the
characterization of the problem as one of only disparate impact and the limitations of the law’s reach. It then concludes with implications for algorithmic discrimination in contexts other than employment, for which
disparate impact liability is not an option.
A. Title VII Disparate Impact
In interpreting Title VII, the U.S. Supreme Court has read the statute to
allow two main legal frameworks for proving discrimination: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.213 As described previously, disparate impact reflects antisubordination principles of substantive equality by recognizing that, in some cases, treating all people the same when they are

211. See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind”
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000).
212. See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to
Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 464 (2006).
213. Other litigation theories are categorized as falling within these two main divisions; for example, retaliation, harassment, and pattern-or-practice claims are all types of disparate treatment. See,
e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986–89 (1988).
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situated differently, as members of different protected classes, may have
discriminatory results. The disparate impact framework was first articulated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1971 case Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,214
based on the statutory text of Title VII making it unlawful for an employer
“to limit, segregate, or classify . . . employees or applicants . . . in any way
which would deprive . . . any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of . . . race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”215 Disparate impact applies when an
employer adopts a “facially neutral” policy or practice that it applies to all
applicants or employees equally, but which results in a disproportionately
negative impact on members of one protected class.216 Because the harm
focuses on the discriminatory result of a seemingly fair practice, proof of
an employer’s intent in adopting the practice is not required.217
To prove a disparate impact case under Title VII, a plaintiff or class of
plaintiff applicants or employees must first make out a prima facie case by
showing that the defendant employer’s practice resulted in a statistically
significant disparity against a protected class when compared to the proper
labor market.218 This showing creates an inference of discrimination and
shifts the burden of proof to the employer, who can rebut the statistics to
show that there is, in fact, no disparate impact to meet plaintiffs’ burden of
proof.219 Alternatively, the employer can prove the affirmative defense that
the employment practice is “job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity,” which will excuse the disparate impact
as lawful.220 Even if the employer proves business necessity, plaintiffs may
still prevail by showing that there is a less discriminatory “alternative employment practice” that the employer “refuses to adopt.”221
Current scholars agree that algorithmic decision-making may lead to
disparate impact discrimination, but raise concerns that disparate impact
law as currently construed may allow employers to escape liability.222 First,
assuming that plaintiffs can show that an employer’s use of algorithmic
decision-making created a disparate impact by protected class,223 a court
214. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
216. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
217. Id.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii).
220. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
221. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
222. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 675; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 902–09.
223. Barocas and Selbst do not focus on the challenges to the plaintiff of making out a prima
facie case, instead focusing on the other two parts of disparate impact doctrine. Kim suggests that it
may be difficult for plaintiffs to identify the “[proper] labor market” for comparison given that an algo-
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could allow an employer to prevail by using the algorithm itself to prove its
affirmative defense.224 Traditionally, though not required by law, employers prove that a practice is job related and consistent with business necessity through what is known as a “validation study” that demonstrates that the
practice is a valid measure for job performance.225 Among possible validation studies are “criterion” or “construct” validation studies that prove how
closely a challenged practice measures the likelihood of success on the job
in question.226 As scholars correctly explain, a predictive matching algorithm that is trained on data of a model “good employee” and then selects
candidates for hire that match the model is self-validating.227 Because a
predictive matching algorithm is, in essence, a criterion validation study,
even if it incorporates discriminatory data, a court could choose to excuse
any disparate impact it causes because it selects employees in a way that is
inherently job-related.228
That said, there may be room under existing law to require more demanding proof from an employer before the employer is found to satisfy its
affirmative defense. While an algorithm will always meet the “job related”
half of the defense by design, it may not necessarily meet the “business
necessity” half. It is true that, as Barocas and Selbst suggest from their survey of relevant caselaw, courts have not been exacting in applying the
business necessity standard, instead allowing some amount of “jobrelatedness” to suffice.229 They describe the affirmative defense as lying
“somewhere in the middle of two extremes”: “that the hiring criteria bear a

rithm assumes a closed universe of data. To remedy this, she proposes, as one of her four suggestions to
improve the law, that plaintiffs be able to show a disparate impact on the training data rather than in
comparison to the relevant labor market. See Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 919–20; see also
supra Section I.B.2.
224. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, 704–09; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 866–67,
905–09.
225. See EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.5,
1607.15–.16 (1978).
226. Id.
227. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 704–09; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 866–
67, 905–09.
228. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 708–09 (“[T]here must be statistical significance
showing that the result of the model correlates to the trait . . . determined to be an important element of
job performance[]. This is an exceedingly low bar for data mining because data mining’s predictions
necessarily rest on demonstrated statistical relationships. . . . Thus, there is good reason to believe that
any or all of the data mining models predicated on legitimately job-related traits pass muster under the
business necessity defense.”); Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 908 (“If an employer could meet
this burden simply by showing that an algorithm rests on a statistical correlation with some aspect of
job performance, then the test is entirely tautological, because, by definition, data mining is about uncovering statistical correlations. Any reasonably constructed model will satisfy the test, and the law
would provide no effective check on data-driven forms of bias.”).
229. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 705 (describing that “all circuits seem to accept
varying levels of job-relatedness rather than strict business necessity”).
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‘manifest relationship’ . . . or . . . be ‘significantly correlated’ to job performance” on one side and that it “accurately—but not perfectly—
ascertains an applicant’s ability to perform [the job] successfully” on the
other.230
Yet because the law does not require a criterion validation study, it also need not be satisfied by one. In addition to criterion and construct validation, there is a third type of validation study, “content” validation, which
tests the validity of a selection practice by testing how closely it measures
successful performance on the actual tasks of a job rather than characteristics of successful employees in the abstract.231 Given that a hiring algorithm
could serve as a criterion validation of itself but still discriminate, courts
could hold that such a study is not enough to meet the employer’s burden
of proof and instead require content validation. Similarly, Kim proposes
that, under existing law, in the context of algorithmic discrimination, statistical correlation alone should not be enough to meet an employer’s defense
of business necessity; instead, courts should require employers to “defend
the accuracy of the correlations” as unbiased.232 An alternative to Kim’s
suggestion is for courts to hold that, in cases challenging algorithmic discrimination, criterion validation studies do not satisfy the employer’s burden of proof for the business necessity affirmative defense. Both proposals
may be possible under existing doctrine: while the basic affirmative defense was created by statute, it was not further defined, and whether it has
been met in a particular case is a matter for the fact finder.233
What is more, requiring a content validation study rather than a criterion validation study could encourage employers toward stereotype-reducing
uses of algorithms and away from stereotype-activating ones.234 For example, a content validation study would more closely resemble a blind-skillschallenge algorithm that recognizes and tests applicants’ skills for the job
rather than their qualities in the abstract. If only content, but neither criterion nor construct, validation studies were allowed to support a business necessity defense in a lawsuit alleging algorithmic disparate impact,
employers may move away from relying on the more problematic miningand-matching algorithms that seek to match an abstract “good employee”
profile—or at least toward a combined use of both mining-and-matching

230. Id. at 704–05 (footnote omitted).
231. See EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.5,
1607.15–.16.
232. Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 921; see also supra Section I.B.2.
233. See, e.g., Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1999).
234. See supra Subpart II.C.
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and testing-and-tracking algorithms—to reduce bias in their hiring processes.235
In addition, even if a court defers to an employer’s business necessity
proof, plaintiffs may still prevail if they can prove that the employer refused to adopt a less discriminatory alternative practice.236 While acknowledging that this may be the most promising option for liability under
existing disparate impact law, Barocas and Selbst remain less than optimistic. As they describe it, “a plaintiff could argue that the obvious alternative
employment practice would be to fix the problems with the models,” yet
because “[f]ixing the models . . . is not a trivial task,” the chance that a
plaintiff could prevail in such a circumstance “seems slim.”237 In particular,
they express concern that, even if plaintiffs could identify how to cure a
model of its bias, they must still prove that the employer refused to adopt
it.238
Again, this concern may understate the reach of existing disparate impact law. While it is true that, as Barocas and Selbst identify, “[n]either
Congress nor courts have specified what it means for an employer to ‘refuse’ to adopt the less discriminatory procedure,” caselaw has made clear
that proof that an employer could use its own selection device in a less discriminatory manner may suffice.239 Thus, plaintiffs may show either that
the employer could have used the same algorithm in a less discriminatory
way—for example, as one factor in hiring instead of as the entire hiring
process—or that the employer could have removed certain biased factors
from the algorithm that would have reduced its discriminatory effect.240 Of
course, as Barocas and Selbst argue, isolating the relevant factors from an
algorithm will not be easy as a matter of proof.241 Yet given efforts in the
field of computer science to advance technical tools to reduce algorithmic
bias, it may become possible to discover, adjust, and recreate an existing
algorithm to reduce its disparate impact.242 If so, this may be the best opportunity yet to reach algorithmic discrimination under existing disparate
impact law: providing expert evidence that, by making adjustments to an
employer’s own algorithm, it is possible to create a less discriminatory alternative.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra Subpart I.A. (describing the different types of algorithms used at work).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 706, 709–10.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 710; see, e.g., Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 504–05 (3d Cir.1999).
See, e.g., Lanning, 181 F.3d at 504–05.
See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 709–10.
See, e.g., Feldman et al., supra note 100.
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Under existing disparate impact doctrine, courts can require more from
an employer to satisfy its business necessity defense than mere statistical
correlation, and courts can side with plaintiffs where an employer’s own
algorithm could be used in a less discriminatory way. Still, that a biased
algorithm may be able to serve as its own justification for any disparate
impact it creates calls into question the underlying neutrality of the algorithm, and calls for a closer examination of framing algorithmic discrimination as disparate treatment.
B. Title VII Disparate Treatment, Using Stereotype Theory
The second major legal framework for proving discrimination under
Title VII is disparate treatment. Traditional disparate treatment reflects anticlassification principles of formal equal treatment. It was first articulated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1973 case McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,243 based on the statutory text of Title VII making it unlawful for an
employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual . . . [in] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”244 In contrast to disparate impact’s application to facially
neutral practices, disparate treatment has been interpreted by courts to require proof of “intentional” discrimination and to apply when protected
class was a “motivating factor” in an adverse employment action.245
Importantly, while disparate treatment requires “intentional” acts, Title
VII’s definition of discriminatory “intent” is broader than its terminology
implies. A great deal of legal scholarship has addressed this issue, a full
analysis of which is beyond the scope of this Article.246 However, several
key guidelines are clear. First, to be intentional, disparate treatment does
not require protected class animus; in fact, it does not even require acting
with conscious awareness that you are discriminating.247 For example, if an
employer adopts a practice of hiring candidates by subjective review of a

243. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
245. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802
(1973).
246. See Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1077–83
(2017); see also id. at 1077 n.134 (describing the literature on the topic and noting that, as of August
2016, a “Westlaw search resulted in over 4,600 cases and over 2,100 journal and law review articles
discussing intentional discrimination or intent to discriminate under Title VII, dating back to 1967”).
247. See id. at 1077–83; Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1364 (2009);
Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1243, 1248,
1289–94 (2008).
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resume and interview and acts intentionally when applying that process to
each individual applicant, applicants who believe they were evaluated
worse and not hired because of their race can sue for disparate treatment,
even if the employer did not believe the decision was racially motivated.248
Second, intentional disparate treatment is virtually always proven by circumstantial evidence: defendants rarely admit that a protected characteristic entered into their decision-making process, nor must they.249 Third,
under what is known as the stereotype theory of liability, acting intentionally on the basis of a stereotype associated with a protected class constitutes
disparate treatment on the basis of that protected class.250
While traditional disparate treatment reflects anticlassification principles, modern disparate treatment incorporates antistereotyping principles
from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that require individuals to be treated
individually, even within their protected class.251 As cases brought under a
stereotype theory of disparate treatment have held, an employer who judges
an employee for work-related purposes on the basis of stereotypes associated with a protected class may commit intentional discrimination, even if
the employer does not recognize its own bias or is operating on the basis of
benevolent motives.252 Indeed, in hundreds of cases over five decades, Title
VII jurisprudence has demonstrated that intent is a broad concept that can
be proven with a variety of circumstantial evidence, even despite an employer’s stated intention or policy of nondiscrimination.253
Title VII disparate treatment claims can be brought on an individual or
a class-wide basis. For individual claims, the plaintiff follows the burdenshifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas.254 Plaintiff applicants or employees must show a prima facie case of disparate treatment
that (1) they are a member of a protected class, (2) they were qualified for
the position, (3) they experienced an adverse employment action, and (4)
the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference
of discrimination.255 The prima facie burden is not a hard one to meet: the
plaintiff can use any relevant evidence to meet step 4, including comparator

248. See, e.g., Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 92; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(plurality opinion), superseded in part by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012), as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 n.4
(2014); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
249. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Bornstein, supra note 246, at 1077–83.
250. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
251. See id. at 250–52.
252. See supra Subpart II.B; see, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir.
2009); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2004).
253. See Bornstein, supra note 246, at 1077–83.
254. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
255. Id.
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evidence if available, statistical evidence if relevant,256 and, if a case is
brought under the stereotype theory, evidence that protected class stereotypes played a role in the decision.257 Once the plaintiff has met the prima
facie case, a burden of production shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action—a low
bar to meet, as any nondiscriminatory reason will usually suffice.258 Finally, the burden of persuasion shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s stated reason for the adverse employment action was a “pretext”
and not the real reason for the decision, which was the plaintiff’s protected
class.259
For class-wide disparate treatment claims, known as “pattern or practice” claims, the proof structure is different. As established in 1977 in the
U.S. Supreme Court cases Hazelwood School District v. United States and
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the plaintiff applicants or employees must show that an employer’s regular employment
practices are discriminatory using statistics and anecdotal evidence to create an inference of discrimination.260 This statistical part of the prima facie
case is met in the same way that plaintiffs prove disparate impact, described above, by showing a statistically significant disparity by protected
class from expected results using the relevant labor market.261 Yet plaintiffs
must also usually provide other anecdotal evidence to support the statistics
in order to infer discriminatory intent: for example, anecdotal evidence
from individuals who experienced discrimination or other evidence that
stereotypes were at play.262 Once plaintiffs have met the prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the inference of discrimination by
either challenging plaintiffs’ statistics or offering legitimate reasons for the
disparity.263 As compared to the defendant’s burden in responding to a disparate impact claim, the rebuttal burden on a defendant in a pattern-or256. Id. at 803–05.
257. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded in part
by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012), as
recognized in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 n.4 (2014).
258. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
259. Id. at 804; see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 246, 256 (1981).
Plaintiffs can also allege disparate treatment under a “mixed motive” framework of disparate treatment,
for which they need only show that protected class status was “a motivating factor” rather than the sole
factor for the decision, but the employer has a complete defense to damages if they can show that they
would have made the same decision anyway. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).
260. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307–09 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337–40 (1977).
261. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 307; Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339; supra
Subpart III.A.
262. See, e.g., Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 694 F.2d 531, 552–53 (9th Cir.
1982).
263. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 310; Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340.
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practice case is relatively lower; the ultimate burden of persuasion remains
with plaintiffs, to prove that the employer’s practices were discriminatory.264
With one exception, current scholarship views the harm of algorithmic
discrimination as outside of the realm of disparate treatment and instead a
matter for the disparate impact framework. Barocas and Selbst
acknowledge that, in the unlikely event that an algorithm is used with the
purpose of covering up intentional discrimination, this “masking” would be
actionable disparate treatment.265 This would occur if an employer were to
include protected class membership as a variable and intentionally manipulate pieces of an algorithm to get the discriminatory result it desired.266
Likewise, Kim suggests that only one fact pattern of algorithmic discrimination “easily fits within the conventional [disparate treatment] framework”: “[w]hen an employer intends to discriminate but relies on an
apparently neutral data model to justify its decisions.”267
By creating scenarios that assume animus on the part of the decision
maker, both examples understate the reach of “intent” in disparate treatment law. If an employer acts intentionally in a way that applies stereotypes associated with protected classes to individuals, and the result of that
action is protected class discrimination, that may be actionable disparate
treatment under a stereotype theory.268 Indeed, Barocas and Selbst and Kim
start from the assumption that the data on which an algorithm is based may
be inherently discriminatory. If, as they suggest, “data are not neutral,”269
and “data mining can reproduce existing patterns of discrimination [or] inherit the prejudice of prior decision makers,”270 why should we treat algorithms as “facially neutral”? Under Title VII, “unintentional” does not
mean the same thing as “facially neutral,” and “intent” is its own animal.271

264. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254) (explaining that “[defendant] had a rebuttal burden, but to meet that burden, [defendant]
needed only to produce evidence that ‘raise[d] a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated’”).
265. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 692–93, 701 (“[A]side from rational racism and
masking (with some difficulties), disparate treatment doctrine does not appear to do much to regulate
discriminatory data mining.”).
266. Id. at 692–93. However, they suggest that “litigation arising from it likely would be tried
under a ‘mixed-motive’ framework, which asks whether the same action would have been taken without
the intent to discriminate.” Id. at 693 n.85.
267. See Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 903.
268. See Bornstein, Unifying, supra note 155, at 928; Bornstein, supra note 246, at 1083–85.
269. Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 860, 883 (“Data mining models are thus far from neutral. Choices are made at every step of the process—selecting the target variable, choosing the training
data, labeling cases, determining which variables to include or exclude—and each of these choices may
introduce bias along the lines of race, sex, or other protected characteristics.”).
270. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 674.
271. See Bornstein, supra note 246, at 1083–85.
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For this reason, at least some forms of algorithmic discrimination may be
litigable as disparate treatment under the stereotype theory of Title VII.272
Despite their focus on a disparate impact approach, Barocas and Selbst
lay the foundation for a stereotyping argument by identifying two types of
human biases or stereotypes that may be introduced—in foundational
ways—into algorithmic decision-making.273 First, when selecting target
variables and training data on which to train a machine-learning algorithm
to find “good employees,” programmers must define what constitutes a
“good” employee.274 If the algorithm is trained on data that itself incorporates subjective biases—for example, past performance evaluation scores or
other subjective qualities selected by the employer—it will incorporate
such bias into any correlations it makes.275 Second, if the algorithm is designed to determine its own pattern of decision-making based on past biased decisions, it will reproduce such bias in future decisions.276 Barocas
and Selbst explain that “[a]utomating the process in this way would turn
the conscious prejudice or implicit bias of individuals involved in previous
decision making into a formalized rule that would systematically alter the
prospects of all future applica[tions]”—for example, they suggest, rejecting
all applicants from historically black colleges because the employer had
done so consistently in the past.277 Both of these patterns can be described,
as Barocas and Selbst suggest, by the “adage in computer science: ‘garbage
in, garbage out,’” where the “garbage out” is discriminatory employment
decisions.278
Although current scholarship fails to recognize it, an employer intentionally applying a system to individuals that starts from a “garbage in”
position infected by protected class bias may constitute disparate treatment.
In particular, the use of predictive matching by algorithm to find applicants
that fit a model “good employee” may pose a problem of protected class

272. According to Kim, “[r]eliance on algorithms will typically be a facially neutral employment
practice . . . [but d]ata models that do not explicitly categorize on the basis of race or other protected
categories may nevertheless operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for disadvantaged groups” and be challenged under disparate impact. Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 905. Just because a practice does
not “explicitly categorize” by protected class does not make it neutral; many practices that do not do so
can be challenged using disparate treatment, for example human subjective decision-making processes.
273. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 677–87.
274. Id. at 679.
275. Id. at 679–80.
276. Id. at 680–84.
277. Id. at 682.
278. Id. at 683–84, 697 n.113 (“The efficacy of data mining is fundamentally dependent on the
quality of the data from which it attempts to draw useful lessons. If these data capture the prejudicial or
biased behavior of prior decision makers, data mining will learn from the bad example that these decisions set. If the data fail to serve as a good sample of a protected group, data mining will draw faulty
lessons that could serve as a discriminatory basis for future decision making.”).
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stereotyping. If an employer creates a model employee based on past subjective decision-making that incorporates protected class stereotypes and
then applies that model to each future applicant, seeking to hold each individual to the stereotype of “good employee,” that may no longer be a “facially neutral” practice. Just because a computer formula is making the
decisions instead of a human does not wash away prior bias and make its
application “neutral.” This is demonstrably different than being a “facially
neutral” practice for which a disparate impact analysis is appropriate.279
The employer is not saying, for example, “We want people who score
eighty percent on this test”; instead the employer is saying, “We want people who match this type of person.” It is, in effect, like a hiring manager
looking for applicants who “fit in” or looking for someone who is “management material.” It is subjective decision-making by formula.280
Moreover, because AI is meant to mirror the human brain, subjective
decision-making by a computer programmed by a human or modeled on
past human decisions should be treated the same, for liability purposes, as
subjective decision-making by a human. The employer who relies on its
discriminatory results should be held liable to a similar extent under the
law. Barocas and Selbst seemingly entertain, and reject, this possibility; but
their analysis is based on an overly narrow view of the definition of intent
in Title VII, presuming that “discriminatory data mining is by stipulation
unintentional.”281 While they are correct that “the law does not adequately
address unconscious disparate treatment,”282 they use this statement to
prove too much. And while “the doctrine [of Title VII] focuses on human
decision makers,”283 a human decision maker’s application of a biased
model may be enough.284

279. See Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 906–07 (discussing the difference between algorithmic discrimination and traditional testing for which disparate impact was designed); see also Bodie
et al., supra note 20, at 1027–28 (suggesting that, if Uber’s customer performance rating system is
vulnerable to bias, aggregating the data in an application makes the data look neutral, but it is not).
280. Cf. Bodie et al., supra note 20, at 1017–18 (“[P]redicting future behavior based on characteristics of people who behaved in desirable or undesirable ways in the past . . . [or p]rofiling contains
risks, in large part because classification and division is literally discrimination. Its purpose is to allow
judgments to be made based on someone’s membership in a group rather than based on their own individual merits. In fact, profiling can create new stereotypes on which people are judged.”).
281. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 698.
282. See id. at 698 (citing Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2006); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past
the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 1000 (2005)).
283. Id. at 699 (emphasis omitted).
284. See Bornstein, supra note 249, at 1083–85. But see Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 700
(suggesting that, “to be found liable under current doctrine, the employer would likely both have to
know that this is the specific failure mechanism of the model and choose it based on this fact”); Sullivan, supra note 13, at 8 (arguing that a computer making decisions using AI “isn’t human, so it can’t
‘intend’ to discriminate,” as required for disparate treatment liability).

BORNSTEIN FINAL3 (DO NOT DELETE)

564

11/30/2018 2:11 PM

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:2:519

This is, by no means, an easy or clear harm to identify. Algorithmic decision-making that incorporates stereotypes may fall into a gray area between what looks like disparate treatment and what looks like disparate
impact.285 Nevertheless, unearthing the potential for unlawful stereotyping
is essential to ensure bias-free algorithms. For a stereotyping claim, it is not
enough that an employer selects candidates using an objective factor that
merely correlates with protected class. For example, if an employer has a
stated preference for hiring military veterans, just because demographically
more men may be veterans does not mean that a woman could sue for unequal treatment or stereotyping, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.286 A female applicant
disadvantaged by this identifiable and objective data point—you either are
a veteran or you are not—could only allege disparate impact.287
But imagine that the preference is not an objective data point—for example, the employer prefers to hire employees it believes have “leadership
abilities” or will be “aggressive.” This is no longer a purely objective factor; determining whether a candidate has these qualities requires a subjective assessment of who is or is not a leader or aggressive. If a human
decision maker looks at a female candidate’s resume and assumes that, because it shows her to have a traditionally feminine background, she lacks
these qualities so the decision maker does not hire her, the applicant could
now allege gender stereotyping—even if the decision maker was not aware
of its own biases. If an algorithm is trained to look for “aggressive leaders”
by matching individuals to the group data of its successful employees with
traditionally masculine backgrounds, and it assumes future behavior based
on these past masculine cues, excluding those who do not match, the algorithm is now doing the stereotyping.
Under this formulation, an individual who believes they experienced
discrimination when compared against a biased algorithmic model could
sue for individual disparate treatment under a stereotype theory. Like Ann
Hopkins, the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, individuals judged against a
model that incorporates and reproduces disadvantage by race or sex by defining “good employee” could argue that they were rejected based on a
failure to match a biased stereotype regardless of their ability to do the

285. Cf. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
773–82 (2006) (discussing the limiting impact disparate impact doctrine has had on disparate treatment
theory and concepts of intent).
286. 442 U.S. 256, 276–78 (1979).
287. See id.
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job.288 To pursue this claim, plaintiffs would apply the same framework as
would a plaintiff alleging Barocas and Selbst’s or Kim’s masking approach,
but would prove stereotyping instead of animus to establish intent. Plaintiffs would argue that they were members of a protected class, met the minimum qualifications for the position, were not hired, and that a suspect
algorithm is to blame, which they would show using statistics or factors in
the algorithm that incorporated stereotyping. When the employer raises the
algorithm itself as the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, if plaintiffs can
prove that the algorithm is biased, they will have proven pretext.
Plaintiffs could also, or instead, allege a class claim of pattern or practice disparate treatment using a stereotype approach. Like the plaintiffs in
Teamsters and Hazelwood, plaintiffs who can show a statistically significant disparity in hiring by protected class from the relevant labor market
could argue that an employer’s algorithmic hiring constituted a pattern or
practice of disparate treatment.289 To pursue this claim, plaintiffs would
create a prima facie case the same way as would plaintiffs alleging disparate impact. The rebuttal burden would then shift to the employer, who
could either rebut the statistics or provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the disparity. Again, however, an algorithm shown to be infected
with bias will not be considered “nondiscriminatory.” While the challenge
for plaintiffs is that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with them to
overcome defendants’ argument, the advantage when compared to disparate impact is that there is no opportunity for the employer to raise a “business necessity” defense. Either the plaintiff proves the algorithm is unfairly
biased or the employer demonstrates that it is not; validation studies do not
suffice in pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claims.290
Of course, establishing the evidence necessary to prove either individual or pattern-or-practice disparate treatment liability poses significant challenges to plaintiffs that cannot be overstated. The challenges that current
scholars identify in accessing the necessary proof in the context of disparate impact apply similarly to the context of disparate treatment.291 Plaintiffs
will likely need access to complex algorithms that may be inaccessible or
from which individual factors may not be parsed, particularly if they in-

288. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded
in part by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012),
as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 n.4 (2014).
289. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307–08 (1977); Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
290. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 310; Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358; EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 342 (7th Cir. 1988).
291. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 701–13; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 901–
09.
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volve “black box” machine learning.292 Nevertheless, practical matters of
proof should not determine whether a theory of litigation can apply to a
particular fact pattern; such matters may determine whether plaintiffs will
prevail under a given theory, but that is a separate matter. To the extent that
Barocas and Selbst and Kim identify challenges in proving a case of
“masking” but acknowledge that masking is a matter of disparate treatment
conceptually,293 the same can be said of disparate treatment under a stereotype theory. And to the extent that defining a relevant labor market or specific factors within an algorithm that could be less discriminatory poses
challenges in cases that Barocas and Selbst and Kim identify as disparate
impact cases,294 if a case is properly framed as a pattern-or-practice disparate treatment case, similar challenges in proving the case should not change
that frame.
When the use of predictive matching algorithms has a discriminatory
result due to biases built into the data model, framing the problem as one of
disparate treatment rather than disparate impact is important for several
reasons. First, as a matter of law it is wrong to excuse discriminatory algorithms as “facially neutral” when they are more like subjective decisionmaking by computer. While it is possible to litigate the discriminatory results of subjective decision-making practices as disparate impact,295 it is
theoretically more accurate to do so as disparate treatment.296 The fact that
a flawed algorithm can be its own proof to satisfy the business necessity
defense illustrates the problem of starting from a position of “neutrality.”
Second, so properly framed, employers facing liability under current law—
or at least the specter of having to rebut a flawed algorithm as nondiscriminatory—will be more motivated to correct problematic algorithms, or, as
discussed in Part II, to use algorithms differently, in ways that suppress
rather than reinforce stereotypes. A disparate treatment lawsuit carries with
it a stronger message of discriminatory culpability and the prospect of
greater damages for plaintiffs297—both of which provide stronger incentives to employers to take preventative action. Lastly, identifying that, in
292. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 701–13.
293. See id. at 696; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 903–04.
294. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 11, at 701–13; Kim, Data-Driven, supra note 13, at 901–
09.
295. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 989–93 (1988).
296. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1219, 1229–37 (1995)
(“The disparate impact paradigm . . . is an inappropriate analytical tool for addressing the intergroup
biases inherent in subjective decisionmaking. . . . From a phenomenological standpoint, subjective
practices discrimination is a disparate treatment problem, not a disparate impact problem, and it requires a disparate treatment solution.” (emphasis omitted)).
297. Compensatory and punitive damages are only available for “intentional” discrimination;
thus, they are not available in disparate impact lawsuits. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012).
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some cases, algorithmic discrimination may constitute disparate treatment
under a stereotype theory is essential for those seeking to challenge algorithmic discrimination outside of the employment context, where a disparate impact theory of liability may not be available.
C. An Antistereotyping Approach to Algorithmic Discrimination
Beyond the Workplace
Computer algorithms are now being used to make decisions in all areas
of life. If, as current scholarship has documented, algorithms may incorporate and even magnify the biases inherent in the data on which they rely,
the potential for algorithmic discrimination exists well beyond the workplace. Yet even if an algorithm can be proven to have disparate effects by
protected class, not all antidiscrimination law recognizes a legal claim for
disparate impact. Importantly, unless a relevant statute applies,298 discrimination challenges brought against state or federal governments’ uses of algorithms—for example, in decisions about criminal justice, government
benefits, or even tax auditing—will be brought under the constitutional law
of Equal Protection, which does not allow a plaintiff to sue for disparate
impact.299 For this reason, considering an antistereotyping approach to algorithmic discrimination is essential.
As described previously, the antistereotyping principle in antidiscrimination law grew directly out of Equal Protection jurisprudence: “the basic
principle that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
protect persons, not groups,” and that “all governmental action based
on . . . a group classification . . . should be subjected to . . . judicial inquiry
to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed.”300 A commitment to rooting out protected class stereotypes and
to striking down state action that reinforces them is as important to Equal
Protection as it is to Title VII.

298. For example, in the context of government action in employment or housing, disparate
impact is available by statute under Title VII (employment) or the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–3619 (2012) (housing). See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015) (holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding, for the first time, that disparate
impact claims are cognizable under Title VII).
299. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1978). Note that constitutional challenges to governmental uses of algorithms may also be brought on other grounds, including under the Due Process
Clause. This is beyond the scope of the Article’s focus on protected class discrimination.
300. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis omitted).
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While a full analysis of the application of constitutional law to algorithmic discrimination is beyond the scope of this Article,301 a brief explanation of the law and one example serve to illustrate the importance of stereotype theory in such a situation. Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits disparate treatment by protected class
but does not provide redress for disparate impact. In Washington v. Davis302—a case about government hiring practices, but which was brought
under the Equal Protection Clause, not Title VII303—the Court rejected the
proposition that “a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government” discriminates “simply because it may affect a
greater proportion of one race than of another.”304 While “[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant,” the Court held, “it is not the sole touchstone of
an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution” and,
“[s]tanding alone,” it is not actionable.305 To challenge algorithmic discrimination under Equal Protection, then, a government use of algorithms
would have to constitute unequal treatment based on protected class.
One prominent example of a governmental use of algorithms that could
be subject to an Equal Protection challenge is algorithmic risk assessment,
used in the criminal justice context for things like predictive policing or
sentencing and parole decisions.306 As with any algorithm, the specific variables incorporated and the way the algorithm is used will determine its
legality. But, some scholars307—and at least one court308—have suggested

301. A separate and growing body of scholarship has begun to address the constitutionality of
algorithms in the context of criminal justice under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH
TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115
MICH. L. REV. 1023 (2017); Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59
(2017); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
327 (2015); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705 (2016);
Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 231 (2015); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2019); John Lightbourne, Damned Lies & Criminal Sentencing Using Evidence-Based Tools, 15
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 327 (2017); Selbst, supra note 101; Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing,
56 B.C. L. REV. 671 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias Out (July 20,
2018) (draft on file with the author).
302. 426 U.S. 229 (1978).
303. At the time this case was filed in 1970, Title VII did not apply to the public sector; thus, the
plaintiffs alleged discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment (applying to
the D.C. government). In a 1972 amendment, Title VII was extended to cover government employers.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 103, 111–13 (1972)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2012)).
304. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Lightbourne, supra note 301, at 337–42; Starr, supra note 301, at 821–41.
307. See, e.g., Lightbourne, supra note 301, at 337–42; Starr, supra note 301, at 821–41.
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that explicitly including protected class status, such as gender, in an algorithmic criminal risk assessment could give rise to a disparate treatment
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.
Once explicit consideration of a protected class is removed, however,
an antistereotyping approach may be a plaintiff’s only option if a predictive
risk assessment algorithm still has discriminatory results. As in the employment context, individual plaintiffs in the predictive policing context
could argue that they are being penalized on the basis of stereotypes associated with protected class groups. Of course, as in employment, a measurable objective factor that correlates with protected class may give rise to
only disparate impact, not disparate treatment harms. For example, if the
choice to police a certain neighborhood known to have a higher crime rate
disproportionately affects African Americans, that is a disparate impact
problem—a person arrested there is either inside the neighborhood or not.
However, where the choice of who to arrest involves a subjective assessment—for example, an assessment of who is more likely to affiliate with
gang members309—stereotyping may be at play. Much as there is a fine line
between applying a stated preference for veterans (disparate impact) and
assuming from group data that an individual is or is not likely to be a
“leader” or “aggressive” (possible stereotyping), there is a fine line between applying actual data on incidents of crime (disparate impact) and
assuming from group data that an individual is or is not likely to commit a
crime (possible stereotyping).310 The same argument could apply: algorithms based on group data that may incorporate human bias or past discrimination are not “neutral” just because they are made by a computer.
That said, just because an algorithm relies on protected class stereotypes—or even includes explicit consideration of a protected class—does
not mean that its use will be ruled unconstitutional. A predictive risk assessment algorithm itself, or its use in a policing, sentencing, or parole decision, may likely survive a constitutional challenge depending on the
requisite level of scrutiny applied—strict scrutiny if race or national origin
(“narrowly tailored” to further a “compelling” government interest)311 or
intermediate scrutiny if gender (“substantially related” to an “important”
government interest).312 Indeed, even the court that considered whether ex-

308. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 766–67 (Wis. 2016) (discussing the issue but analyzing it under the Due Process Clause because the defendant had not raised an Equal Protection claim).
309. For a discussion of what Andrew Selbst describes as “person-based” (as opposed to “placebased”) predictive policing, see Selbst, supra note 101, at 137–40.
310. See supra Subpart III.B (comparing preference for military veterans and preference for
“aggressiveness” or “leadership” assumptions).
311. Id.
312. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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plicitly including sex as a factor in an algorithmic criminal risk assessment
could raise constitutional concerns held that it did not do so in the facts before it, where the risk assessment was used as only one factor in the plaintiff’s parole decision.313
Moreover, as with algorithmic decision-making in the employment
context, there is reason to believe that using algorithms in criminal risk assessment may actually better serve equality goals relative to current criminal justice practices by improving upon biased subjective human decisionmaking.314 But where such algorithms do indeed result in discrimination,
recognizing the potential for stereotype theory to give rise to a disparate
treatment challenge under the Equal Protection Clause may influence governmental agencies to attempt to correct potential algorithmic biases, based
not only on explicit protected classes but on associated stereotypes, too.
CONCLUSION
The rise of algorithms and AI offer a great deal of promise to help
make better decisions faster by adding objectivity with data and correcting
for human biases. But any improvement to traditional decision-making that
relies on data will depend on what data is being used and how. Handled
properly, algorithms can suppress, interrupt, or remove protected class stereotypes from decisions; handled improperly, they become a form of stereotyping, making assumptions about the future behavior of individuals by
judging them against composite data on the past behavior of a group.
As current scholarship on algorithmic discrimination in the workplace
has convincingly demonstrated, while algorithms may suppress human biases, they may reproduce and even exacerbate structural biases. Proposed
solutions to date focus on requiring those using algorithmic decisionmaking to document and mitigate their own biases or on reinterpreting antidiscrimination law to meet the new challenge of algorithmic discrimination. Both proposals would make significant improvements to reducing and
313. See Loomis, 881 N.W. 2d at 766–67. Note, however, that the plaintiff in this case did not
raise the challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, so the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered and
rejected his gender discrimination claim under the Due Process Clause. Id.
314. See, e.g., Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 301, at 389–
90 (noting that, while big data policing has downsides, human policing judgments “include explicit and
implicit biases…and the frailties of human perception,” and “racial stereotypes can influence suspicion”
so that “[r]eplacing those generalized intuitions” with real data “should result in a more accurate policing strategy”). Cf. Selbst, supra note 101, at 115–16 (“Like other sectors’ use of data mining, predictive
policing is sold in part as a way to counteract the conscious or unconscious prejudices of human decision-makers—in this case the police. And it has the potential to do so. But . . . express consideration of
race is not necessary for data mining to have a disproportionate racial impact.”); Starr, supra note 301,
at 850–55 (noting that, while advocates of data-based predictive tools for sentencing argue they are
“superior to available alternatives,” to say “that actuarial prediction outperforms clinical prediction
is . . . a generalization that is not true in every case”).
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redressing algorithmic discrimination at work if adopted. Yet both also start
from the assumption that algorithms are “facially neutral”—even when
those algorithms incorporate human biases and stereotypes or prior past
discrimination. This assumption unnecessarily hampers the ability of current antidiscrimination law to address an issue that is not just a problem of
disparate impact.
Antidiscrimination law requires that people be treated equally, but it also requires that they be treated individually and not be judged against stereotypes associated with protected classes. Applying an antistereotyping
lens to the problem of algorithmic discrimination suggests that, when individuals are judged against a model of group data that incorporates protected
class stereotypes and then rejected for failing to conform to those stereotypes, that may constitute intentional stereotyping. Having a computer execute what amounts to composite subjective decision-making does not make
otherwise biased action “facially neutral.” If AI is meant to model human
decision-making and, in fact, incorporates human biases and stereotypes,
an employer should be held accountable for the discrimination it creates to
the same extent that the employer would be if it relied on a biased human
decision maker.
The suggestion that algorithmic discrimination can be considered intentional discrimination will likely be subject to criticism. The most obvious
counterargument is that algorithms just combine objective data points about
candidates and then compare individuals to make hiring decisions. Indeed,
if the data is truly objective, this is a valid criticism. For this reason, testing-and-tracking algorithms that measure the candidate’s performance on
job-related tasks or that blind decision-makers to potential sources of bias
may not be implicated. If the data is truly objective, then there has been no
stereotyping and no such theory of liability would apply. But where an algorithm includes subjective data, like prior performance evaluations or past
hiring decisions, or seeks to match candidates to a model employee that
incorporates protected-class-related stereotypes, it is not neutral. If the algorithm discriminates, employment decisions that rely upon it should be
challenged accordingly.
A second counterargument is that, even if you agree that certain types
of algorithmic decision-making should be treated like human subjective
decision-making, reaching biased human subjective decision-making poses
challenges of its own under current Title VII doctrine. In the U.S. Supreme
Court decision Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, for example, the Court refused to find that widespread subjective decision-making, without more,
could constitute a common question to support a pattern-or-practice claim
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of sex discrimination.315 Thus, even if a machine-learning algorithm could
be treated like a human brain, in the context of subjective decision-making
that results in discrimination, it is not easy to establish disparate treatment
liability for decisions made by a human brain either. Any challenge to algorithmic employment discrimination under existing law will not be easy,
particularly given that the challenges of producing proof to satisfy a plaintiff’s burdens in any Title VII case are made all the more difficult by the
“black box” of predictive algorithms and AI. But, if a predictive matching
algorithm makes subjective assessments of candidates that result in discrimination, it may, ironically, be easier to expose human cognitive biases
and stereotypes when they are incorporated into an algorithm than when
they are held inside the brain of a human.316 And the algorithm itself would
be the uniform way in which human subjectivity was exercised—the “glue”
that the Wal-Mart majority said was lacking to support a pattern-or-practice
disparate treatment claim of sex discrimination in that case.317
Workforce analytics have become a multibillion-dollar industry, which
is likely to continue to grow in the future.318 Regulating to require employers to document their algorithmic choices before they use them is an important, direct solution. Strengthening existing law to help remedy
algorithmic disparate impacts after they occur would, no doubt, help reduce
and redress its occurrence. Applying an antistereotyping approach under
existing law offers additional incentives and guidance. Framing algorithmic
discrimination as actionable disparate treatment under a stereotype theory
may raise the specter of potential liability under current law enough to motivate the costly and complex efforts that may be needed to rid certain algorithms of bias. Moreover, if the stated goal of data-based tools for hiring is
to reduce discrimination and increase diversity, incorporating an antistereotyping approach can be of help. The technology has the potential to improve upon human decision-making by suppressing or removing human
biases. It is a mistake, then, to excuse algorithms that incorporate human
stereotypes and structural discrimination as “neutral.” Considering an antistereotyping approach can help discourage the use of algorithms in ways
that exacerbate bias and instead help unleash their antidiscriminatory potential.

315. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
316. See Kroll et al., supra note 13, at 634 (“The . . . biases of human decisionmakers can be
difficult to find and root out, but we can peer into the ‘brain’ of an algorithm: computational processes
and purpose specifications can be declared . . . and verified . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
317. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 352.
318. See Bersin, supra note 55.

